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ABSTRACT
Civil protection orders are effective, yet under-used weapons in the battle against 
domestic violence.  In New York and in other states as well, civil orders of protection 
provide unique benefits and remedies to domestic violence victims that are in addition 
to, or that are in place of, the benefits the criminal system offers.
They are under used in part because they are not available to all victims. In every state, 
the availability of civil protection orders is limited to those victims who are in certain 
defined relationships.  While many states have expanded their definitions of the types of 
relationships that qualify for protection, too many states still deny protection to victims 
in dating relationships, cohabitation relationships, same-sex relationships, and other 
domestic relationships. 
New York limits access to its civil orders of protection to fewer types of victims than any 
other state.  It finds the need for civil protection only where the definitions of “family 
offense,” a restricted list of crimes, and “family or household member,” a restricted list 
of persons, intersect.  A historical explanation exists for this state of the law.  The 
system was created in the 1960s by a legislature that was attempting to provide 
“practical help” to traditional families by taking cases out of criminal court and 
placing them in the exclusive jurisdiction of the family court.  Its goal, above all, was to 
keep traditional families together.  Civil orders of protection were invoked to serve that 
goal.  Over time, though, a social shift in the perception of domestic violence occurred.  
As the focus moved from the goal of family cohesion to the goal of ending violence, the 
courts and the legislature attempted to strike a balance between the two competing 
interests.  Ultimately, the legislature and the courts created, in what could perhaps be 
characterized as a historical accident, the dual inquiry, or “bifurcated” system that 
exists today.
The role of protection orders also shifted from serving the goal of family cohesion to 
serving the goal of violence cessation.  This shift in role, coupled with the parallel shift 
in the state’s interests, renders the historical rationales for maintaining this system 
meaningless.  New York, as all other states, must reform its civil protection order 
statutes to capture all victims of domestic violence, and to include all crimes as bases 
for protection.  To the extent the legislature can provide current rationales to maintain 
its differential treatment of domestic violence victims, it must at least provide rational 
reasons that bear some relation to the goals the civil order of protection statutes serve.  
It is not at all clear that the legislature can satisfy that burden here.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1988, Linda White was working in a supermarket to support 
herself and her family, including her disabled brother.  It was there that she 
met John Strouble.  The two quickly fell in love, and John moved in with 
Linda a month after they had met.  But, before long, John began to abuse 
Linda.  He would tie her up when he left their home.  He savagely beat her, 
and often raped her, once using a broken broomstick.  On several occasions, 
once after threatening to throw her from the roof of their apartment 
building, he would fire his gun in the air, then hold it to her temple and pull 
the trigger on an empty chamber, forcing her into a game of Russian 
roulette.
In 1989, Linda looked to the Family Court in Brooklyn New York 
for help.  She wanted a civil order of protection.  The first clerk she talked 
to told her that she was not entitled to an order of protection against her 
abuser because they were not married, nor did they have a child together.  
She went to the next window and told a lie she thought would save her life:  
“I had to lie and say I was married with kids so that I could get my order of 
protection, even with a black eye.”1  After telling this lie to the clerk she 
was finally given her order of protection.  One month later, claiming self-
defense, Linda White shot John Strouble.  At trial, the district attorney used 
against her the lie that she told to the Brooklyn clerk.  The jury convicted 
Linda of murder in the second degree and she was sentenced to seventeen 
years to life in prison.2
Mario Escalante, Susan Orellana’s stepfather, raped Susan when she 
was eleven years old.  He was tried and convicted of rape.  Susan’s mother 
divorced her daughter’s rapist.  Eventually, he was released from jail and 
started to stalk Susan who was now twenty-one.  New York did not yet have 
anti-stalking legislation,3 so criminal court was not an option.  Instead, she 
1
 Marcela Rojas, Escape From Abuse: Clemency Seen as Milestone for Victims, 
JOURNAL NEWS, May 19, 2003 at 1A.
2 In Re Linda White, Petition for Executive Clemency,  (On file with the Author).  
Notably, after serving 13 years, Linda White was granted clemency on Christmas Eve, 
2002 by Governor Pataki.  The order of protection was cited by the governor as evidence of 
the abuse that Linda suffered.  Press Release, Office of Governor Pataki, Governor Pataki 
Grants Clemency to Four Inmates, (Dec. 24, 2002) (on file with author).
3
 For a discussion of the history of stalking laws in New York, see Demetra Pappas, 
Stopping New Yorkers’ stalkers:  an anti-stalking law for the millennium, 27 FORDHAM 
URB. L. J. 945 (2000).
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went to Family Court to obtain a civil protection order against him.  
Ultimately, the court told her that it the only way it could grant a civil order 
of protection order against her stalker and former rapist was if her mother 
had stayed married to him.4
Despite two decades of change, domestic violence remains a threat 
to women’s safety.5  Even the most conservative numbers indicate that, 
each year, women victimized by their intimate partners number in the 
millions.6  The statistics do not analyze the data based on whether a victim 
is married to her abuser or not.  Instead, they reflect the reality that women 
in all forms of intimate relationships can be victims of abuse by their 
partners. 7  The National Institute of Justice estimates that approximately 1.5 
million women each year are assaulted or raped by an intimate partner, 
while approximately 500,000 women are stalked.8  In 2000, 1,247 women 
were killed by their intimate partner, or about 33% of all women killed were 
killed by their intimate partners; in 2001, intimate partner violence made up 
20% of all violent crime against women.9  Domestic violence is still the 
4 Orellana v. Escalante, 653 N.Y.S.2d 992, 993 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
5
  Other than in arguing that protective order legislation should be expanded to cover 
all intimate relationships, including members of same-sex relationships, this article focuses 
on the threat of domestic violence as it applies to women.  This focus does not mean to 
deny that men also fall victim to domestic violence, but it recognizes the reality that the 
majority of domestic violence victims are females.  See, e.g., Callie Marie Rennison, Sara 
Welchans, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Intimate Partner Violence 1 (2000) available at 
http://www.ojp.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ipv.pdf. (Concluding that in 2000, 85% of domestic 
violence was committed against women).
6
 Michele Waul, Civil Protection Orders:  An Opportunity for Intervention with 
Domestic Violence Victims, 6 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 51, 52 (2000); 
7
 The statistics cited here are based on the prevalence of “intimate partner” violence, 
which includes violence committed by current or former spouses, boyfriends or girlfriends.  
See, e.g., Rennison, supra note 5 at 2. (“as defined in this report, intimate relationships 
involve current or former spouses, boyfriends or girlfriends.  These individuals may be of 
the same gender.”).
8 See Patricia Tjaden & Nancy Thoeenes, Nat'l Inst. of Justice & Ctrs. for Disease 
Control & Prevention, Extent, Nature, and Consequences of Intimate Partner Violence 9 
(2000), available at  http://nij.ncjrs.org/publications.  The study surveyed 8,000 women by 
telephone.  The study also concluded that because many women are re-victimized, an 
estimated that 4.8 million rapes and assaults are perpetrated against women each year.
9
 Callie Marie Rennison U.S. Dep't of Justice, Intimate Partner Violence 1993-2001, 1 
(2003) available at http:// www.ojp.usdoj.gov . 
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leading cause of injury to women between ages 15 and 44 in the United 
States—more than car accidents, muggings, and rapes combined.10
Because of its prevalence, the response to domestic violence has 
been drastic and widespread, especially in the last ten years.  There are 
more shelters, more training programs, and more legislation.  Police are 
more willing to arrest abusers, and the public is more educated about the 
effects of domestic violence on victims.  But, while it is less likely that a 
woman today would be forced to resort to homicide to protect herself as 
Linda was over a decade ago, a woman today who finds herself in a 
relationship like Linda’s would still have to lie to obtain a civil order of 
protection in New York.  Similarly, while Susan would now have the option 
to seek protection in New York’s criminal court from her rapist and stalker, 
it would be her only option.  She would still be unable to obtain a civil order 
of protection from him.
Domestic violence civil protection orders11 are effective, yet under-
used weapons against domestic violence.  They provide remedies and 
benefits to victims that are unavailable in criminal court.12  Studies suggest 
that protection orders are effective in preventing and de-escalating some 
forms of domestic violence.13  They also “work”14 in other ways by giving a 
10
 Indiana University Protection Order Project, http://www.law.indiana.edu/pop (last 
visited Sept. 3rd, 2003).   But, on a positive note, Dr. Rennison’s study estimates that 
between the years of 1993 and 2001, the number of nonfatal violent crimes (defined as 
rape, sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault and simple assault) committed by intimate 
partners against females declined by 49%.  Rennison, supra note 9 at 1.
11
 The term “domestic violence civil protection order” is used here to differentiate 
them from other types of civil protection orders.  Every state now has statutory schemes in 
place that are meant to address the problem of domestic violence.  They can provide for 
protection, funding, services for victims, and reduced filing-fee provisions.  See e.g., Mass. 
Ann. Laws ch. 208, § 34D, ch. 209, § 32, ch. 209A, § 5A, 7, ch. 209C, § 15 (Law. Co-op 
2001).  Domestic violence civil protection orders fall under these schemes.  Some states do 
provide for civil orders of protection outside the domestic violence context.  Compare, 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-1809 (2003) (allowing “any person” to obtain an injunction against 
another for acts of harassment) with Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3601-2 (2003) (“A person may 
file . . . for an order of protection for the purpose of restraining a person from committing 
an act included in domestic violence).
12
 This article does not attempt to suggest that criminal courts should be divested of 
jurisdiction over acts that are crimes; instead, this article argues that victims of domestic 
violence should be able to use the civil courts to protect themselves in addition to their use 
of the criminal courts.
13
  Victoria Holt, M.A. Kernic, M.E. Wolf, F.P. Rivara, Do Protection Orders Affect 
the Likelihood of Future Partner Violence and Injury?  24 AM. J. OF PREVENTATIVE MED.
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victim a sense of control over her life.15  They are under used in part 
because they are not available to all victims. In every state, the availability 
of domestic violence civil protection orders is limited to those victims who 
are in certain defined relationships.  While many states have expanded their 
definitions of the types of relationships that qualify for protection, too many 
states still deny protection to victims in dating relationships, cohabitation 
relationships, same-sex relationships, and other domestic relationships.  
New York in particular has the most restrictive domestic violence 
civil protection order coverage in the union.  It only grants civil orders of
protection to victims if they satisfy two criteria.  First, they must be a 
member of the abuser’s “family or household.”  This definition is unduly 
restrictive.  “Members of the same family or household means only the 
following:  (a) persons related by consanguinity16 or affinity;17 (b) persons 
16-21 (2003).
14
  This term is put in quotes as borrowed from Professors Cahn and Meier.  In their 
article addressing the intersection of domestic violence and clinical education they stated 
that “while there is a great deal of sensational publicity about murders of women who had 
obtained protection orders, in the experience of the authors, protection orders frequently do 
"work"; they often deter further violence and empower the victims to make further changes 
for their own safety. Success stories of this kind do not appear in the press because the 
absence of violence is not considered a newsworthy event.”, Naomi Cahn, Joan Meier, 
Domestic Violence and Feminist Jurisprudence: Towards a New Agenda, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. 
L. J. 339, 347 (1995).
15
 In this way, civil protection orders may “work” more effectively than criminal 
orders of protection because the victim, not the government, is the petitioner.  The victim 
chooses when to file and directs the strategy of obtaining the order, all in contrast to the 
criminal system.  Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for 
Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 
808 (1993).  For instance, in Colorado, a protection order is issued automatically in all 
criminal and juvenile cases involving victims.  The orders are entered at the time of 
arraignment and are in effect until final case disposition, which includes the time of any 
probation or parole.  The order restrains the defendant “from harassing, molesting, 
intimidating, retaliating against or tampering with any witness to or victim of the acts.  In 
juvenile cases, the juvenile’s parents or legal guardian is also restrained under the order. 
Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 18-1-1001, 19-2-707 (2003).   The court has the discretion to add or 
delete conditions as the situation warrants.  Id.
16
 “Consanguinity” is the “relationship by blood.”  Bryan A. Garner, A DICTIONARY OF 
MODERN LEGAL USAGE 204 (2nd ed.)
17
“A relation of affinity is based upon marriage and divorce destroys the foundation of 
that relation.”  Escalante, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 993 citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 59 (6th
ed. 1990).
15-Apr-04] A Call for Reform 7
legally married to one another; (c) persons formerly married to one another; 
and (d) persons who have a child in common regardless whether such 
persons have lived together at any time.”18
Second, a victim must also establish that the abuser committed a 
“family offense” against her.  This list is also unduly restrictive and does 
not contemplate treating a large amount of violent crimes as crimes of 
domestic violence.  Instead, it includes only the specific following crimes, 
each of which is in turn defined by New York’s Penal Law:  disorderly 
conduct, harassment in the first and second degree, aggravated harassment 
in the second degree, menacing in the second and third degree, reckless 
endangerment, assault in the second and third degree, attempted assault, 
stalking in the first, second, third, and fourth degree.  As a result of this dual 
inquiry, a large number of victims are denied civil protection orders entirely 
either because they do not share the requisite relationship with their abusers, 
or because they were not victims of the “correct” type of domestic violence.
This dual inquiry exists not only in New York’s civil system, but 
also in its criminal system.  As a consequence, in connection with ongoing 
criminal cases, New York provides for two types of criminal orders of 
protection:  “family offense” orders of protection and standard orders of 
protection.  “Family offense” orders of protection provide more remedies 
and protections than standard orders.  Where an abuser is arrested and 
charged with a crime, the criminal court will issue a “family offense” order 
only to those same victims who are permitted to seek protection in family 
court.  Namely, they must also be members of the same “family or 
household” as their abusers, as well as victims of a “family offense.”
New York’s system suffers from the vestiges of a scheme that its 
legislature set up in the 1960’s, a time when domestic violence was thought 
to be a private matter to be dealt with only in family court.  This resulted in 
a dual inquiry, or “bifurcated” system that left both family and non-family 
members unequally protected.  Nevertheless, the legislature has refused to 
fix its system and to provide adequate protection to all victims from all 
crimes of domestic violence.  The reasons the legislature historically gave 
to deny coverage no longer exist, and there are few, if any, contemporary 
rationales that exist to maintain the differential treatment of victims.
Using New York as a model, this article will ultimately argue that 
domestic violence civil protection order statutes in all states should be 
amended to capture the remaining victims of domestic violence, and all acts 
18
 N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.11; N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 812(1)(a)-(d).
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that constitute domestic violence.  It will argue that all victims of domestic 
violence, regardless of their marital status, should be permitted to seek the 
benefits of civil protection orders.
Part I of this article will give some background information about 
civil protection order legislation as it has developed in New York and other 
states.  Part II will generally describe the current relationship requirements.  
It will conclude that New York has the most restrictive relationship 
requirements in the country.  Part III will briefly explain the structure and 
limitations of New York’s “bifurcated” system for granting orders of 
protection in civil and criminal court.  Part IV will demonstrate that civil 
orders of protection are effective in the battle against domestic violence.  
Part V will provide a historical explanation for New York’s existing 
differential treatment of domestic violence victims.  Finally, Part VI will 
argue that the historical explanations for New York’s differential treatment 
of victims not longer exist and that its system is in need of reform to allow 
all victims of domestic violence the ability to obtain civil orders of 
protection.
I.  BACKGROUND OF CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS
Before the 1970s, orders of protection were sought primarily by 
prosecutors in connection with existing criminal cases.19  The only way a 
person could obtain a civil order of protection was in divorce court.20  The 
courts’ civil powers to issue orders of protection were considered secondary 
to their substantive powers, and most chose not to exercise them outside a 
divorce proceeding context.21
In New York in 1962, the legislature was under increasing pressure 
to deal with the “emerging” problem of domestic violence.22  It was 
19
 Molly Chaudhuri & Kathleen Daly, Do Restraining Orders Help?  Battered 
Women’s Experience with Male Violence and Legal Process, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:  
THE CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 227, 230-31 (Eve Buzawa & Carl Buzawa 
eds. 1992).
20
 Id.
21 EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:  THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE RESPONSE, 235 (3d ed. 2003).
22
  The use of the word “emerging” here is not meant to suggest that domestic violence 
did not exist prior to 1962.  The opposite is certainly true.  Several commentators have 
suggested that until the turn of the century, crimes that took place in the home were 
considered private rather than public, and therefore evaded governmental intervention or 
review.  See, e.g., ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY, 72 (New York, 1987).  See 
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generally accepted that treatment rather than criminal prosecution was the 
best solution for problems in the family.23  The legislature had the desire not 
to punish, but to provide “practical help.”24  As a result, chapter 686, the 
Family Court Act, which also created the procedure to obtain a civil order 
of protection, was enacted.25  It gave Family Court “exclusive, original 
jurisdiction over any proceeding concerning acts which constitute 
disorderly conduct or an assault between spouses or between parent and 
child or between members of the same family or household.”26  The 
exclusive jurisdiction provisions were eliminated in 1996, and the Criminal 
Court now enjoys concurrent jurisdiction over the cases that can also be 
heard in Family Court.27
By the late 1970s, the problem of domestic violence and the failings 
of government to respond adequately were gaining recognition across the 
country.28  The clear push by victim advocates and feminists was to 
also MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH:  LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA, 6, 11 (1985).  The fact that legislators were slow to 
respond most likely reflects the enduring point of view that domestic violence is a private 
matter to be dealt with within the confines of the home, and, in fact, the Family Court Act 
reflects this position.  For a detailed discussion of the public/private distinction and its 
intersection with domestic violence from a historical perspective, See Linda Gordon, 
HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES:  THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE, 14 (New 
York, 1988).  But, the pervasive idea that domestic violence was a “private” matter until it 
was brought into “public” view is largely ahistorical.  Instead, wife-beating was protected 
as an affirmative, statutory, and therefore, “public” right until the mid-nineteenth century.  
Professor Reva Segal argues that as feminists began to reform chastisement laws during the 
Reconstruction Era, judges began to assert that the legal system should not interfere in 
cases of wife beating “in order to protect the privacy of the marriage relationship and to 
promote domestic harmony.”  Reva Siegel, The Rule of Love: Wife Beating As Prerogative 
and Privacy, 105 YALE L. J. 2117, 2119 (1996).
23 See Douglas J. Besharov, Practice Commentary, MCKINNEY'S CONSOLIDATED 
LAWS OF NEW YORK, JUDICIARY, FAMILY COURT ACT (Book 29A), § 812, at 171.
24
 Id; The Family Court Act, Report of Joint Legislative Committee on Court 
Reorganization, 1962 McKinney Session Laws (Vol. 2) 3428, 3444 (1962).
25
 N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act. § 812 (McKinney 1975) (repealed).
26
 N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act. § 812 (McKinney 1975) (repealed).
27
 The ultimate election requirement’s elimination did not eliminate the district 
attorney’s discretion to decide not to pursue criminal charges against a defendant in 
criminal court. N.Y. Crim. P. L. 530.12(14) (McKinney 2003).
28 See, e.g., See, e.g., D. MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES (1976); Joan Zorza, The Criminal 
Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970-1990, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 240-
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strengthen governmental responses to domestic violence, especially in the 
criminal justice system.29
Until 1976, only one state other than New York had civil domestic 
violence protection order legislation.30  Across the country, police, 
prosecutors, and criminal courts were slow to respond to the problem, so 
advocates of battered women began to push for legislation that would allow 
victims relief in civil court.31  Pennsylvania passed its Protection from 
Abuse Act of 1976, which created an avenue for victims of domestic 
violence to obtain protection orders outside the context of criminal court or 
civil divorce proceedings.32  Other states began following suit.  By 1994, all 
fifty states had adopted some form of domestic violence civil protection 
order legislation.33  States are repeatedly revisiting their protection order 
legislation to expand protection, to reduce the cost of obtaining them, to 
streamline the process of obtaining them, and to create state and national 
registries for the protection orders.34
279 (1992).
29
 Id; See e.g., Jeffrey Fagan, U.S. Department of Justice, The Criminalization of 
Domestic Violence: Promises and Limits, 6-15 (1996) available at: 
http://www.ncjrs.org/txtfiles/crimdom.txt.  The theory at the time was to criminalize 
domestic violence in order to increase awareness and public response by establishing it as a 
public criminal act rather than a private family matter.  See e.g., Gordon, supra note 22 at 
22-25.
30
 Clare Dalton, Elizabeth Schneider, BATTERED WOMEN AND THE LAW, 499 
(Foundation Press 2001); Janice Grau, Jeffery Fagan, & Sandra Wexler, Restraining 
Orders for Battered Women:  Issues of Access and Efficacy, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLITICS 
AND WOMEN:  THE AFTERMATH OF A LEGALLY MANDATED CHANGE 13, 14 (1985).
31
 Buzawa Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE RESPONSE 234 (3d ed. 1996); Andrew Klein, Re-Abuse in a Population of Court-
Restrained Male Batterers: Why Restraining Orders Don’t Work, 211 in DO ARREST AND 
RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds. 1996).
32
 Janice Grau et al. supra note 30 at 14. 
33
 Mathew J. Carlson, et al., Protective Orders and Domestic Violence:  Risk Factors 
for Re-Abuse, 14 J. Fam. Violence 205, 206 (1999); Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa, 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 123 (2d ed. 1996).
34 See, e.g., U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office for Victims 
of Crime, Enforcement of Protective Orders, 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/bulletins (Jan. 2002); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 208, 
§ 34D, ch. 209, § 32, ch. 209A, § 5A, 7, ch. 209C, § 15 (Law. Co-op 2001).  In 1992, 
Massachusetts was the first state to create a computerized database of all domestic violence 
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The options for relief that civil protection orders provide are granted 
by statute and are often more comprehensive than those available in 
criminal and other non-domestic violence orders of protection.35  Civil 
protection orders can require the abuser to stay away from the victim, to 
refrain from contacting, threatening, harassing, stalking the victim, or 
committing acts of violence against her.36  Also, in some states, a judge 
issuing a civil protection order can include orders relating to child custody 
and visitation.37  They can also require a person restrained to seek 
counseling38 and drug or alcohol treatment,39 they can grant the petitioner 
possession of the residence or other property,40 child support, or other 
economic relief,41 and can keep the petitioner from having access to the 
petitioner’s personal information.42
The process for obtaining a civil protection order varies by 
jurisdiction.  In most jurisdictions a temporary or emergency protection 
order, valid for a short time, can be obtained immediately without a full 
hearing.43 Often these are granted ex-parte, or without the abuser’s 
restraining orders issued within the state.  Under Massachusetts law, criminal and civil 
record searches are required for each protection order application.  Id.  Several states have 
followed Massachusetts’ lead by improving protection order verification procedures.  See, 
e.g., Ala. Code § 18.65.540 (2001); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3608 (2000); Cal. Fam. Code. 
§ 6380 (Deering 2001); Cal. Penal Code § 13701 (Deering 2001); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6-
803.7 (2000); Fla. Stat. § 741.30 (2000); La. Rev. Stat. § 46:2136.2 (2000); N.D. Cent. 
Code § 12-60-23 (2000); W. Va. Code § 48-24-12(2000); Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-2307 (2000); 
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 403.783 (2001); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 23-3-39.8 (2000).
35
 See discussion infra ftnt --- and text.
36 See e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-13-5 (Michie 2003); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-14-102 
(2001); Cal. Fam. Code § 6300 (2002).
37 See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-14-102 (2001); Cal. Fam. Code § 6300 (2002); Ka. 
Stat. Ann. § 403.740-750 (2003).
38 See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 403.740-750 (2003).
39 See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13.14-102 (2001); Cal. Fam. Code § 6300 (2002).
40 See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-13-5(A)(1) (Michie 2003); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 3113.31(E)(1)(b) Anderson 2003); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 403.740-750 (2003).
41 See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 403.740-750 (2003).
42 See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.2950 (West 2003).
43 See e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 403.740; Waul, supra note 6 at 52.
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presence.44  But, to alleviate due process challenges, courts require that an 
evidentiary hearing follow the issuance of the temporary order, and the 
restrained party must be given notice of the hearing.45  After a hearing, the 
court can render the order “permanent,” but this usually means the order 
will remain in effect for a distinct amount of time, typically one to two 
years.46  Civil rules of procedure apply, including a standard of proof that is 
lower than in criminal cases.47  A judge need only determine that the facts 
alleged in the petition occurred and that the behavior is likely to continue by 
a preponderance of the evidence.48
The punishment for violating a civil protection order varies from 
state to state.  In most states, violations of protection orders are punishable 
at least as misdemeanors.49 Most also provide that a violation of a civil 
44
 Molly Chaudhuri & Kathleen Daly, Do Restraining Orders Help?  Battered 
Women’s Experience with Male Violence and Legal Process, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:  
THE CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 227, 230-31 (Eve Buzawa & Carl Buzawa 
eds. 1992).
45
 Id; Carolyn N. Ko, Note Civil Restraining Orders for Domestic Violence:  The 
Unresolved Question of “Efficacy,” 11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 361, 365 (2002). 
46
 Waul, supra note 6 at 52.  Some states have extended the protection to three years, 
see e.g., Kan. Rev. Stat. § 403.750(2) (2003), while others have extended the time to five 
years.  See, e.g., Iowa Code § 708.12 (2001).  Other states, in the context of criminal 
protection orders, have made protection orders permanent.  See e.g., N.J. Rev. Stat. 
§ 2C:12-10.1 (2001) (making protection orders issued in stalking cases permanent unless 
sought to be dissolved by the victim); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-40e (2001) (granting 
discretion to judges to issue standing criminal restraining orders where they believe such an 
order will best serve the interests of the victim and the public.)
47
 In criminal cases, an order of protection can only remain in effect if the fact finder 
determines that the defendant committed the underlying acts or crimes beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  See, e.g., N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.12(5) (McKinney 2003).
48
 Waul, supra note 6 at 52. 
49
 Kit Kinports & Karla Fischer, Orders of Protection in Domestic Violence Cases:  An 
Empirical Assessment of the Impact of the Reform Statutes, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 163 
(1993).  In New York, for instance, violation of a civil protective order does not constitute 
a substantive crime, but can constitute either civil or criminal contempt depending on the 
circumstances of the violation.  See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 215.52 (violation of a “duly 
served” order of protection constitutes a class D felony if “he or she intentionally or 
recklessly causes physical injury or serious physical injury to a person for whose protection 
such order was issued”); see also, N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act. § 846-a (family court has power to 
commit respondent to not more than six months jail for willful violation of a civil 
protection order).
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protection order is grounds for charges of civil or criminal contempt.50  In 
some states, a repeat violator of protection orders can be charged with a 
felony,51 and both fines and jail time can be imposed.52  Only a very few 
have required a minimum term of confinement for protection order 
violations.53  Almost every state has enacted warrantless arrest policies for 
those suspected of violating a valid protection order.54
II.  THE RELATIONSHIP REQUIREMENT
To qualify for a domestic violence civil protection order, the person 
petitioning must show he or she has a relationship with the respondent.55
As of 1995, the relationship requirement in a majority of states was more 
restrictive than it is today.  By that year, thirty-three states mandated that 
50
 Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the 
Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3,12 (1999) 
(discussing the legislature's response to domestic violence); Kit Kinports & Karla Fischer, 
supra note 49; Peter Finn & Sarah Colson, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Protection Orders:  
Legislation, Current Court Practice, and Enforcement, (1990).  The U.S. Supreme Court 
has held that a criminal prosecution for conduct that also resulted in a criminal contempt 
conviction for violating a protection order did not violate the Constitution’s Double 
Jeopardy Clause. United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993); People v. Wood, 95 
N.Y.2d 509, (2000) (Interpreting N.Y. Crim. Pro. § 40.20 (McKinney 2001)). However, 
some state courts have disagreed and have determined that a defendant cannot be 
prosecuted both for criminal contempt and criminal charges of protection order violations. 
See. e.g., State v. Lessary, 865 P.2d 150, 155 (Haw. 1994) ("we conclude that the 
interpretation given to the double jeopardy clause by the United States Supreme Court in 
Dixon does not adequately protect individuals from being 'subject for the same offense to 
be twice put in jeopardy”).
51 See, e.g., 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 720-5/12-30 9 (2001); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 25.07 
(Vernon 2000); Wash. Rev. Code § 26.50.110 (2001).
52
 Klein & Orloff, supra note 15 at 1095-99.
53
 Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 586-11 (2003) (imposing minimum forty-eight hours jail for first 
offense, and minimum of thirty days for the second); Iowa Code § 236.14 (2001); 720 Ill. 
Comp. Stat. § 5/12-30 (2001).
54
 Linda G. Mills, Commentaries, Killing Her Softly:  Intimate Abuse and the Violence 
of State Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 550, 558 (1999).  However, in New York, 
warrantless arrest provisions do not apply to criminal protection orders, and they only 
apply to domestic violence orders of protection if the abuser either violates a “stay away” 
provision, or commits a new crime.  N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 140.10 (McKinney 2003).
55
 For a discussion of the relationship requirement as it relates to teens, see Stacy L. 
Brustin, Legal Responses to Teen Dating Violence, 29 FAM. L. Q. 331, 339 (1995).
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only individuals who were married, related by blood, had a child in 
common with the respondent, or were living together with the respondent, 
qualified for civil protection orders.56  Since then, the tide has changed.  
Several states have amended their statutes to become more inclusive.  In all 
fifty states, victims related to their abusers by blood or marriage are 
permitted to seek domestic violence orders of protection.  The remaining 
breakdown of the relationships and the number of states that cover them are 
detailed below.57
A.   Parents of a Common Child
As of 1993, only forty-one states provided for protection of parents 
of a child in common.58  Today, forty-eight states provide protection to 
56 Id.; See Ala. Code § 30-5-2(4) (1975); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13- 3601(A) (1994); 
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-15-103(b) (Michie 1993); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-38a(2) (West 
1994); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 1041(2) (1994); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 741.28(2) (West 1995); 
Ga. Code Ann. § 19-13-1 (1994); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 586-1(2) (1993); Idaho Code § 39-
6303(2) (1993); Iowa Code § 236.2 (1993); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3102 (1993); Ky. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 403.720 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1994); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46:2132(4) (West 
1995); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, § 762(4) (West 1994); Md. Code Ann., Family Law § 4-
501 (1994); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.2950a (West 1994); Minn. Stat. Ann. 
518B.01(2)(b) (West 1995); Miss. Code Ann. § 93-21- 3(d) (1994); Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 455.200 (1994); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-903(4) (1993); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33.018 
(Michie 1992); N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 812(1) (McKinney 1995); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-1(a) 
(1994); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3113.31(A)(3) (Anderson 1993); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 
60.1(4) (West 1995); S.C. Code Ann. § 20-4-20(b) (Law.Co-op.1976); S.D. Codified Laws 
Ann. § 25-10-1(2) (1994); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-601(4) (1994); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 
71.01(b) (West 1995); Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-1 (1990); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1101(2) 
(1994); Va. Code Ann. § 16.1- 279.1 (Michie 1994); Wyo. Stat. § 35-21-102(a)(iv) (1994).
57
 A table reflecting the breakdown of states’ treatment of each type of relationship is 
attached as Appendix A.
58 See Klein & Orloff, supra note 15 at 825.  Alaska Stat. § 25.35.200 (Supp. 1993); 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3601 (Supp. 1993); Cal. Fam. Code S 70 (West 1993); Colo. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14-4-101 (West Supp. 1993); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-15 (West 
Supp. 1993); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 945 (1993); D.C. Code Ann. § 16- 1004 (1989); Ga. 
Code Ann. § 19-13-1 (Supp. 1993); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 586- 1 (Supp. 1992); Idaho Code § 
39-6303 (1993); 750 ILCS 60/103 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); Ind. Code Ann. § 34-4-5.1-1 
(West 1993); Iowa Code Ann. § 236.2 (West Supp. 1993); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.720 
(Michie/Bobbs-Merill 1992); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, § 762 (West Supp. 1992); Md. 
Code Ann., Fam. Law § 4-501 (Supp. 1992); Mass. Gen. L. Ann. ch. 209A, § 1 (West 
1986); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518B.01 (West Supp. 1993); Miss. Code Ann. § 93-21-3 (Supp. 
1993); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 455-010 (Vernon Supp. 1993); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-903 (Supp. 
1992); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33-018 (Michie 1986); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 173-B:1 
(Supp. 1992); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:25-20 (West 1992); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-13-2 (Michie 
Supp. 1992); N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act §§ 846, 812 (McKinney Supp. 1994); N.D. Cent. Code § 
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parents of an existing common child.59  This number includes the states that 
do not specifically provide for co-parents, but provide coverage for 
members in a dating relationship.60  The two remaining states, Louisiana 
and Missouri, do not explicitly include co-parents or members of dating 
relationships as persons who may obtain domestic violence protection 
orders, but they do include cohabitants.61  Louisiana limits its protection to 
14- 07.1-01 (Supp. 1993); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3113.31 (Anderson 1992); Okla. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 22, § 60.1 (West 1992); Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.705 (1991); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 
6102 (1992); P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 8, § 602 (Supp. 1990); R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-15-1 (1988); 
S.C. Code Ann. § 20-4- 40 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 25-10-1 
(1986); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-60 (1991); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 71-01 (West 1992); 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-1 (Supp. 1993); Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-253.1 (Supp. 1993); Wash. 
Rev. Code Ann. § 26.50.120 (West Supp. 1993); W. Va. Code § 48-2A-2 (Supp. 1992); 
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 813.122 (West Supp. 1993); Wyo. Stat. § 35-21-102 (Supp. 1993).
59
 Ala. Code § 30-5-2 (1975); Alaska Stat. § 25.35.200 (1994); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
13- 3601 (2003); Ark. Code Ann. § 9-15-103 (Michie 2003); Cal. Fam. Code § 6211 
(Deering 2003); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-4-101 (West 2003); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-38a 
(West 2003); D.C. Law 10- 237 (2003); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 1041 (2003); Fla. Stat. 
Ann. § 741.28 (West 2003); Ga. Code Ann. § 19-13-1 (2003); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 586-1 
(2003); Idaho Code § 39- 6303 (2003); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 750, para. 60/103 (Smith-Hurd 
2003); Ind. Code § 35-41-1-10.6 (2003); Iowa Code § 236.2 (2003); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-
3102 (2003); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.720 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 2003); La. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 46:2132 (West 2003); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19A § 4002 (West 2003); Md. Code 
Ann., Family Law § 4-501 (2003); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209A, § 1(e) (West 2003); Mich. 
Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.2950 (West 2003); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518B.01 (West 2003); 
Miss. Code Ann. § 93-21- 3 (2003); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 455.200 (2003); Mont. Code Ann. § 
40-4- 121 (2003); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-903 (2003); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33.018 (Michie 
2003); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 173-B:1 (2003); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:25-19 (Lexis 2003); 
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-13- 2 (Michie 2003); N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 812 (McKinney 2003); 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-1 (2003); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-07.1-01 (2003); Ohio Rev. Code 
Ann. § 3113.31 (Anderson 2003); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 60.1 (2003); Or. Rev. Stat. § 
107.705 (2003); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 6102(a) (2003); R.I. Gen Laws § 15-15-1 (2003); 
S.C. Code Ann. § 20-4-20 (Law. Co-op. 2003); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 25-10-1 (2003); 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-601 (2003); Tex. Fam. Code Ann §§ 71.003-006, .0021 (Vernon 
2003); Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-1 (2003); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1101 (2003); Va. Code 
Ann. § 16.1-228 (Michie 2003); Wash Rev. Code. Ann. § 26.50.010 (West 2003); W. Va. 
Code § 48-27-204 (2003); Wis. Stat. § 813.12(1) (2003); Wyo. Stat. § 35-21-102 (2003).
60
 There are only two states that fit this category: Vermont and Mississippi.  Vermont 
does not specifically include parents of a common child, but it does include members of a 
dating relationship regardless of gender.  Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1101 (2003).  Also, while 
Mississippi does not explicitly include parents of a common child, an executive order 
declares that “although not falling into the definition of "family or household member", if 
the individuals have a biological or legally adopted child between them, the relationship is 
also protected.” Op. Atty. Gen. No. 2000-0588, Carrubba, (Oct. 6, 2000).
61
 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46:2132(4) (West 2003); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 455.200 (2003).  
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cohabitants of the opposite sex.62
B.  Cohabitation
Today, including the number of states that do not explicitly provide 
protection for cohabitants, but do include other romantic relationships,63 all 
states but one, New York, provide domestic violence protection orders for 
cohabitants.64  All but two states, Delaware and Maryland, provide 
protection for both present and former cohabitants.65  Delaware, Louisiana, 
However, the fact that both Louisiana and Missouri do not provide protection to all parents 
who share a child regardless of their cohabitancy status creates a dangerous gap in the law.  
See, Klein & Orloff, supra note 15 at 824-825.
62
 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46:2132(4) (West 2003).
63
 Indiana, Montana, and West Virginia do not specifically include cohabitants but they 
do provide protection to members of a dating relationship.  Ind. Code § 35- 41-1-10.6 
(2003); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-206 (2003); W. Va. Code § 48-27-204 (2003).  Of these, 
only Montana limits protection to members of the opposite sex.  Alabama includes “present 
or former household member,” which the courts have interpreted to mean current or former 
cohabitants (Haraway v. Phillips, 2002 WL 1728619 (Ala. Civ. Ct. App.2002) (interpreting Ala. 
Code § 30-5-2 (2003))
64
 Ala. Code § 30-5-2 (2003); Alaska Stat. § 18.66.990 (2003); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
13- 3601 (2003); Ark. Code Ann. § 9-15-103 (Michie 2003); Cal. Fam. Code § 6211 
(Deering 2003); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-4- 101 (West 2003); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-38a 
(West 2003); D.C. Law 16-1001 (2003); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 1041 (2003); Fla. Stat. 
Ann. § 741.28 (West 2003); Ga. Code Ann. § 19-13-1 (2003); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 586-1 
(2003); Idaho Code § 39- 6303 (2003); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 750, para. 60/103 (Smith-Hurd 
2003); Ind. Code § 35-41-1-10.6 (2003); Iowa Code § 236.2 (2003); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-
3102 (2003); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.720 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 2003); La. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 46:2132 (West 2003); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19A § 4002 (West 2003); Md. Code 
Ann., Family Law § 4-501 (2003); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209A, § 1(e) (West 2003); Mich. 
Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.2950 (West 2003); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518B.01 (West 2003); 
Miss. Code Ann. § 93-21- 3 (2003); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 455.200 (2003); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 
40-4-121, 45-5-206 (2003); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-903 (2003); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33.018 
(Michie 2003); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 173-B:1 (2003); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:25-19 (Lexis 
2003); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-13- 2 (Michie 2003); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-1 (2003); N.D. 
Cent. Code § 14-07.1-01 (2003); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3113.31 (Anderson 2003); Okla. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 60.1 (2003); Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.705 (2003); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 
6102(a) (2003); R.I. Gen Laws § 8-8.1-1 (2003); S.C. Code Ann. § 20-4-20 (Law. Co-op. 
2003); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 25-10-1 (2003); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-601 (2003); 
Tex. Fam. Code Ann §§ 71.003-006, .0021 (Vernon 2003); Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-1 
(2003); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1101 (2003); Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-228 (Michie 2003); 
Wash Rev. Code. Ann. § 26.50.010 (West 2003); W. Va. Code § 48- 27-204 (2003); Wis. 
Stat. § 813.12(1) (2003); Wyo. Stat. § 35-21-102 (2003) 
65
 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 1041 (2003); Md. Code Ann., Family Law § 4-501 (2003).  
Other states such as Rhode Island limit protection to those who were cohabitants within a 
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Montana, North Carolina, and South Carolina, limit protection to 
cohabitants of the opposite sex.66
C.  Dating, Sexual and/or Intimate Relationships
By 1995, only fifteen states, as well as the District of Columbia, Puerto 
Rico, and the Virgin Islands, authorized individuals in dating relationships 
to obtain domestic violence civil protection orders.67  Today, a total of 
thirty-five states provide protection to members of some form of dating 
relationship.68  Some states require that the relationship be sexual in order 
certain time.  See, R.I. § 8-8.1-1 (2003) ("’Cohabitants’" means emancipated minors or 
persons eighteen (18) years of age or older, not related by blood or marriage, who together 
are not the legal parents of one or more children, and who have resided together within the 
preceding three (3) years or who are residing in the same living quarters.”)
66
  Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 1041(2)(b) (2003); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46:2132 (West 
2003); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-1 (2003); S.C. Code Ann. § 20-4-20 (Law. Co-op. 2003).  
Montana does not specifically provide for the protection of cohabitants, but does provide 
protection for members of the opposite sex in a “dating or ongoing romantic relationship.”  
Mont. Code Ann. §§ 40-4-121, 45-5-206 (2003).
67
 Brustin, supra note 55 at 340; Alaska Stat. § 25.35.200(4) (1994); Cal. Fam. Code § 
6211(c) (Deering 1994); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-4-101 (West 1994); D.C. Law 10- 237 
(1995); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 750, para. 60/103(6) (Smith-Hurd 1994); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 
209A, § 1(e) (West 1994); Mont. Code Ann. § 40-4- 121(13)(c) (1993); N.H. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 173-B:1(IV) (1994); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:25-19(d) (Lexis 1994); N.M. Stat. Ann. 
§ 40-13- 2(D) (Michie 1993); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-07.1-01(4) (1993); Or. Rev. Stat. § 
107.705(2)(e) (1993); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 6102(a) (1991); P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 8, §§ 
602(i), (k) (1990); R.I. Gen Laws § 15-15-1(5) (1994); V.I.Code Ann. 16, § 91(c) (1994); 
Wash Rev. Code. Ann. § 26.50.010(2) (West 1994); W.Va. Code § 48-2A-2(b) (1994).
68
  Alaska Stat. § 18.66.990 (2003); Cal. Fam. Code § 6211(c) (Deering 2003); Colo. 
Rev. Stat. § 14-4-101 (West 2003); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-38a(2) (2003) (“dating 
relationship”); D.C. Law 16-1001 (2003); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 586-1(2) (2003) (“dating 
relationship” means a “romantic, courtship, or engagement relationship, often but not 
necessarily characterized by actions of an intimate or sexual nature”); Idaho Code § 39-
6303(2) (2003) (“dating relationship”); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 750, para. 60/103 (Smith-Hurd 
2003); Iowa Code § 236.2(e) (includes those who are or were in an “intimate relationship” 
and have had contact within the past year; court is to consider a nonexclusive list of factors, 
including expectation by either party of sexual or romantic involvement); Ind. Code § 35-
41-1-10.6(2)-(3) (2003); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3102 (2003); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19A 
§ 4002(4) (West 2003); (“family or household members,” which includes individuals who 
are or were sexual partners.”); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209A, § 1(e) (West 2003); Mich. 
Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.2950(30)(a) (West 2003) (“dating relationship means frequent, 
intimate associations primarily characterized by the expectation of affectional 
involvement.”); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518B.01(2)(b) (“significant romantic or sexual 
relationship”:   “In determining whether persons are or have been involved in a significant 
romantic or sexual relationship . . .  the court shall consider the length of time of the 
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for the participants to receive protection,69 but most merely require 
something more than a platonic relationship.70  Also, most states that offer 
the protection to members of dating relationships offer it without regard to 
the age of the relationship members.71  However, some limit the protection 
relationship; type of relationship; frequency of interaction between the parties; and, if the 
relationship has terminated, length of time since the termination); Miss. Code Ann. § 93-
21- 3(d) (2003) (includes family or household members who reside together or who 
formerly resided together or between individuals who have a “current dating relationship,” 
which is defined to mean a “social relationship of a romantic or intimate nature”); Mo. 
Rev. Stat. § 455.010 (2003) (“or has been in a continuing social relationship of a romantic 
or intimate nature with the victim”); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 40-4-121, 45-5-206 (2003); Nev. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33.018 (“"dating relationship" means frequent, intimate associations 
primarily characterized by the expectation of affectional or sexual involvement.”); N.H. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 173-B:1 (2003); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:25-19 (Lexis 2003); N.M. Stat. 
Ann. § 40-13- 2 (Michie 2003); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-1(a) (persons of the opposite sex 
who are in a “dating relationship or have been in a dating relationship. For purposes of this 
subdivision, a dating relationship is one wherein the parties are romantically involved over 
time and on a continuous basis during the course of the relationship.”); N.D. Cent. Code § 
14-07.1-01 (2003); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 60.1(4) (2003) (“dating relationship”); Or. 
Rev. Stat. § 107.705 (2003); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 6102(a) (2003); R.I. Gen Laws §§ 15-
15-1, 8-8.1-1 (2003); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-601(4) (dating and sexual relationships); 
Tex. Fam. Code Ann § 71.0021(b) (Vernon 2003) (“dating relationship.”); Vt. Stat. Ann. 
tit. 15, § 1101(2) (2003) (sexual and dating relationships.  "’Dating’" means a social 
relationship of a romantic nature. Factors that the court may consider when determining 
whether a dating relationship exists or existed include: (A) the nature of the relationship; 
(B) the length of time the relationship has existed; (C) the frequency of interaction between 
the parties; (D) the length of time since the relationship was terminated, if applicable.”); 
Wash Rev. Code. Ann. § 26.50.010 (West 2003); W. Va. Code § 48-27-204(3), (4) (2003) 
(sexual or intimate partners or dating); Wis. Stat. § 813.12(1); Wyo. Stat. § 35-21-
102(a)(iv) (2003) (are or were in “dating relationship”).
69 See, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19A § 4002 (West 2003) (“are or were “Sexual 
partners”; Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.705 (2003) (“Persons who have been involved in a sexually 
intimate relationship with each other within two years immediately preceding the filing”).
70 See, e.g., Haw. Rev. Stat. § 586-1(2) (2003) (“’dating relationship’” does not include 
a casual acquaintanceship or ordinary fraternization between persons in a business or social 
context.”); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33.018 (“"dating relationship" . . . does not include a 
casual relationship or an ordinary association between persons in a business or social 
context”); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-1(a) (“A casual acquaintance or ordinary fraternization 
between persons in a business or social context is not a dating relationship”).
71 See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-4-101 (West 2003); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3102 
(2003) (includes “intimate partners and household members,” which includes those in a 
“dating relationship” to be determined by a list of factors); Ind. Code § 35-41-1-10.6(2)-(3) 
(2003) (is dating or has dated the other person; is or was engaged in a sexual relationship 
with the other person);
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to adult members only.72  Others specifically offer protection to both minors 
and adults.73  Of these states, two limit protection to members of a current 
relationship.74  Two others require that the relationship occurred within a 
certain amount of time.75
D.  Pregnancy
Three states, Arizona, Minnesota, and Utah, specifically allow victims 
who are pregnant with the respondent’s child to obtain domestic violence 
civil protection orders.76  Most victims would be entitled to protection under 
the dating relationship protection offered in Minnesota and thirty three other 
states.77  However, in states like New York where the jurisdiction of the 
72 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 813.12(1) ("Dating relationship" means a romantic or intimate 
social relationship between two adult individuals); Wash Rev. Code. Ann. § 26.50.010 
(West 2003) (“persons sixteen years of age or older with whom a person sixteen years of 
age or older has or has had a dating relationship”).
73 See, e.g., R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-15-1 (2003) (“persons who are or have been in a 
substantive dating or engagement relationship within the past one year in which at least one 
of the persons is a minor”) and R.I. Gen. Laws §  8-8.1-1 (2003) (“persons who are or have 
been in a substantive dating or engagement relationship within the past one year”).
74
 Mississippi and North Dakota limit protection to members of a current dating 
relationship.  Miss. Code Ann. § 93-21- 3 (2003) (“individuals who have a current dating 
relationship”); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-07.1-01 (2003) (“persons who are in a dating 
relationship”).  But, North Dakota includes in its statute a catch-all provision, which 
provides domestic violence protection orders to “any other person with a sufficient 
relationship to the abusing person as determined by the court.”  Id.
75
 Rhode Island requires that the relationship occurred within one year, and Oregon 
limits coverage to relationships within the last two years.  R.I. Gen Laws §§ 15-15-1, 8-8.1-
1 (2003); Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.705 (2003).
76 See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13- 3601(A) (2003); Minn. Stat. Ann. 
§ 518B.01(2)(b) (2003) (Minnesota also amended its statute to allow victims in dating 
relationships to obtain civil orders of protection); Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-1 (2003).  For a 
discussion of pregnancy and domestic violence See Evan Stark & Anne Flitcraft, WOMEN 
AT RISK: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND WOMEN'S HEALTH (1996); Hortensa Amaro et al., 
Violence During Pregnancy and Substance Abuse, 80 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, 575-79 (1990); 
and Judith McFarlane et al., Assessing Abuse During Pregnancy: Severity and Frequency 
of Injuries and Associated Entry into Prenatal Care, 267 JAMA 3176-78 (1992).
77
 However, many states do not provide protection for pregnant victims, which creates 
another dangerous gap in the law.  Klein and Orloff have suggested that “the most effective 
way to address these dangerous oversights in the statutes and extend civil protection order 
coverage to abuse victims, whether they have a child in common with the respondent, 
claim to have a child in common, or are presently pregnant with the respondent's child, is 
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courts to provide civil protection orders is limited, women who are pregnant 
with their abusers’ children are denied protection.78
E.  Same Sex Relationships
As of 1993, ten states, Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Florida, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South 
Carolina, specifically denied protection to couples in same sex 
relationships.79  Several other states had statutes open to interpretation.80
Today, that number has been cut in half.  Five states specifically limit 
to . . . cover dating relationships and all intimate partners. Such statutory changes will 
result in the ability to more fully reach those relationships in which violence occurs, and 
will prevent victims of abuse from falling dangerously through statutory cracks.”  Klein 
and Orloff supra note 15 at 828-29.  But, it may be better yet to omit the relationship 
requirement and extend the availability of civil protection orders to anyone in reasonable 
fear of another.
78 See, e.g., Gina C v. Stephen F., 576 N.Y.S.2d 776, 776 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1991) 
(Unborn child was not "child" within meaning of statute conferring jurisdiction for family 
offense proceedings on family court if parties have child in common; thus, family court had 
no jurisdiction over mother's petition for protection order against father who was not living 
with her).  Robert F.Z. v. Michelle McG, 513 N.Y.S.2d 628 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.) (family court 
lacked jurisdiction in case of putative father who denied paternity of unborn child and 
pregnant mother).  In Gina, the court recommended the definition be changed to include 
pregnant mothers:  “The legislature unfortunately has not extended Article 8 protection to 
situations where the sole connection between two unmarried, non-cohabitating individuals 
is an unborn child. Petitioner's only remedy in this matter is to apply to the criminal courts
for protection and redress.  The Court calls upon the legislature to remedy this gap in 
Article 8 and confer upon the Family Court jurisdiction to provide protection from 
domestic violence to pregnant women who find themselves in this situation.”  See e.g., 
Gina C. v. Stephen F., 576 N.Y.S.2d 776, 777 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1991); but see, Gloria C. v. 
William C., 476 N.Y.S.2d 991 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1989) (granting protection order on behalf of 
fetus against abuse by mother’s husband).
79
 Ala. Code § 30-5-2(4) (1989); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3601B (1992); Del. Code 
Ann. tit. 10, §§ 901(9), 1041 (Supp. 1992); Fl. Rev. Stat. § 741.30 (West Supp. 1993); 
Miss. Code Ann. § 93-21-3 (Supp. 1992); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 455.010 (1992); Mont. Code 
Ann. § 45-5-206 (1991); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-1 (1989); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 6102(a) 
(1991); S.C. Code Ann. § 20-4-20(b) (Law. Co-op. 1985);  see also, Hon. Mac D. Hunter, 
Homosexuals as a New Class of Domestic Violence Subjects under the New Jersey 
Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991, 31 U. LOUIS. J. FAM. L. 557, 573 
(1992/1993).
80 See e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.720 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992) (“member of 
an unmarried couple); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46:2132(4) (West 1993) (living as spouses); 
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.2950a (West 1992); R.I. Gen Laws § 15-15-1 (1988 & 
Supp. 1992) (same).
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protection to persons in relationships with someone of the opposite sex in 
some way.81  Delaware and North Carolina specifically limit protection of 
co-parents and cohabitants to heterosexual couples.82  Louisiana and South 
Carolina limit coverage of cohabitants to opposite-sex couples.83  But, 
South Carolina does not specifically exclude members of same-sex 
relationships if they share a child; Louisiana does not have a co-parent 
provision.84  Like South Carolina, Montana limits coverage to members of 
opposite-sex dating relationships, but does not place the same restriction on 
co-parents; however, Montana does not specifically provide protection to 
cohabitants, regardless of their respective gender.85
Until 2000, many states still did not provide coverage to couples in 
dating relationships, provided coverage to cohabitating couples living “as 
spouses,”86 or had other statutory ambiguities that brought their coverage of 
same sex couples into question.87 Since then, with the exception of five, all 
such states have either added coverage to dating couples regardless of their 
81
 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 1041 (2003); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46:2132 (West 2003); 
Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-206 (2003); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-1(b)(2),(6) (2003); S.C. Code 
Ann. § 20-4-20 (Law. Co-op. 2003.
82
 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 1041 (2003) (“domestic violence” is limited to “a man and 
a woman co-habitating together with or without a child of either or both, or a man and a 
woman living separate and apart with a child in common”); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-
1(b)(2),(6) (2003) (“personal relationship” includes “persons of opposite sex who live 
together or have lived together” and “are persons of the opposite sex who are in a dating 
relationship or have been in a dating relationship”).
83
 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46:2132 (West 2003) (“"Household members" means any 
person of the opposite sex presently or formerly living in the same residence with the 
defendant as a spouse, whether married or not”); S.C. Code Ann. § 20-4-20 (Law. Co-op. 
2003) (“Household member" means spouses, former spouses, parents and children, persons 
related by consanguinity or affinity within the second degree, persons who have a child in 
common, and a male and female who are cohabiting or formerly have cohabited”).
84 Id.
85
 Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-206 (2003) (“’Partners’" means spouses, former spouses, 
persons who have a child in common, and persons who have been or are currently in a 
dating or ongoing intimate relationship with a person of the opposite sex”).
86 See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3113.31(A)(3) (Anderson 1993) ("Family or 
household member" only includes “a spouse, a person living as a spouse, or a former 
spouse of the respondent”).
87 See e.g., supra note 80.
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respective genders, or their courts have interpreted the statute as applying to 
same-sex couples.88
F.  No Relationship Requirement
A few states have also removed a relationship requirement altogether.  
They allow anyone to obtain the same type of protection that domestic 
violence protection orders provide without regard to relationship. Typically, 
they only require that the petitioner show she is in reasonable fear of 
imminent harm by the respondent.89
G.  Summary
In ten years, the coverage of domestic violence civil protection 
orders has increased dramatically.  States offering protection to members of 
dating relationships has more than tripled.90  Only thirteen states still restrict 
coverage of domestic violence civil protection orders to those who are or 
were married or related to their abuser, share a child with him, or who are or 
were living with him.91  Two more states, Arizona, and Utah have amended 
88 State v. Yaden, 692 N.E.2d 1097 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (holding gay man was “a 
person living as a spouse” with his partner and was a “family or household member” for 
purposes of the domestic violence statute); Ireland v. Davis, 957 S.W.2d 310, 312 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 1997) (holding homosexual couple fit definition of “couple” for purposes of a 
domestic violence protection order).
89 See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-14-102(4)(a); Ariz. Rev. Stat.. § 12-1809 (allowing 
“any person” to obtain an injunction against another for acts of harassment); Cal. Code Civ. 
P. § 527.6 (allowing any “person” to obtain an injunction against another for "harassment," 
which is defined as unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence . . .  that seriously 
alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. "Credible 
threat of violence" is a knowing and willful statement or course of conduct that would 
place a reasonable person in fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or her immediate 
family, and that serves no legitimate purpose”).
90
 In 1993, only ten states offered protection to members of dating relationships.  
Alaska Stat. § 25.35.200 (Supp. 1993); Cal. Fam. Code § 70 (West Supp. 1992); Mass. 
Gen. L. Ann. ch. 209A, § 1 (West 1992); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 173-B:1 (Supp. 1992); 
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40- 13-2 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.D. Cent. Code § 14.07.1-01 (Supp. 
1993); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6102 (1992); R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-8.1-1 (Supp. 1992) 
('persons who shared an intimate sexual relationship within the past six (6) months'); Wash. 
Rev. Code Ann. § 26.50.010(2)-(3) (West Supp. 1993); W. Va. Code § 48-2A-2 (Supp. 
1993); See Klein & Orloff supra note 15 at 836.
91
 Ala. Code § 30-5-2(4) (2003); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13- 3601(A) (2003); Ark. 
Code Ann. § 9-15-103(b) (Michie 2003); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 1041(2) (2003); Fla. 
Stat. Ann. § 741.28(2) (West 2003); Ga. Code Ann. § 19-13-1 (2003); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 403.720 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 2003); Md. Code Ann., Family Law § 4-501 (2003); 
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their statutes to allow victims who are pregnant with the respondent’s child 
to petition for protection orders.92  The remaining states, save one, also 
permit victims who are dating their abuser to obtain civil protection 
orders.93
In those states where the parties fall outside the states’ relationship 
definitions, victims are unable to obtain a domestic violence civil protection 
order. In these situations, an individual must rely on criminal courts, or they 
must rely on the creativity of the courts to obtain protection.94  This can be a 
difficult and expensive procedure and the remedies available under civil 
protection order statutes may not be available in another context.  Also, 
reliance on the criminal system may be insufficient; evidence to sustain 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt may be lacking, or the government may 
simply be unwilling to proceed with a case.  
III.  ALTERNATE PATHS:  CRIMINAL AND CIVIL ORDERS OF PROTECTION IN 
NEW YORK
Unless she is obtaining a divorce, the only two places a victim of 
domestic violence can get protective relief in New York State are in family 
court and criminal court.95  So, the only place a victim can obtain a civil 
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-903(4) (2003); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3113.31(A)(3) (2003); S.C. 
Code Ann. § 20-4-20(b) (Law.Co-op. 2003); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 25-10-1(2) 
(2003); Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-1 (2003).
92 See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3601(A) (2003); Minn. Stat. Ann. 
§ 518B.01(2)(b) (2003) (Minnesota also amended its statute to allow victims in dating 
relationships to obtain civil orders of protection); Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-1 (2003).  For a 
discussion of pregnancy and domestic violence See Evan Stark & Anne Flitcraft, WOMEN 
AT RISK: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND WOMEN'S HEALTH (1996); Hortensa Amaro et al., 
Violence During Pregnancy and Substance Abuse, 80 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, 575-79 (1990); 
and Judith McFarlane et al., Assessing Abuse During Pregnancy: Severity and Frequency 
of Injuries and Associated Entry into Prenatal Care, 267 JAMA 3176-78 (1992).
93 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
94
 Brustin, supra note 55 at 338; Courts have used creative means to protect victims of 
domestic violence where they do not satisfy statutory definitions.  For example, before the 
statute was amended to cover dating relationships, a court in Wisconsin used a state 
harassment statute to protect a member of dating relationship. Banks v. Pelot, 460 N.W.2d 
446 (Wis. Ct. App.1990).
95
 N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.11-13; N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 842; N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law 
§§ 240(3); 252 (McKinney 2003).  New York does not provide for a person to obtain any 
civil protection order in a general civil court.  While beyond the scope of this article, it is 
notable that all other crime victims have no civil remedy to obtain an order of protection.  
The only way for such a victim in New York to obtain protection from harm is to file a 
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order of protection is to seek relief in family court.  But, a person can obtain 
a civil order in family court only if she falls within the intersection of two 
separate inquiries:  was she a victim of a “family offense,” and was that 
offense committed by a member of her “family or household.”  If she fails 
to meet either of these inquiries, she is barred entirely from obtaining civil 
protection.
The intersection of these two inquiries exists in New York’s 
criminal system as well.  In New York, all victims of crime are entitled to a 
criminal order of protection, which can be obtained from criminal court 
once a defendant is arrested and charged with a crime.  But, there are two 
different types of criminal orders:  “family offense” criminal orders of 
protection, and standard criminal orders of protection.  The family offense 
orders offer additional unique benefits that the standard orders do not.  Like 
the inquiries in family court, to obtain a family offense criminal order, the 
criminal court inquires whether the victim is both a victim of a “family 
offense,” and a member of the defendant’s “family or household” as defined 
in the Family Court Act. 
As a result, New York has a “bifurcated” system, and one of the 
most difficult systems to navigate in the country.  It treats victims 
differently based on their relationships with the abusers and based on the 
crimes the abusers committed against them.  This article focuses on the 
problems with this bifurcated system.  It takes issue both with its definition 
of “family offense” and with its definition of “family or household 
member.”  Such a system does not provide sufficient protection because it 
denies civil protection entirely to one group, and only provides partial 
protection to the other.  
The next section briefly examines the procedures and remedies 
complaint in Criminal Court.  While the court has the discretion to issue an order of 
protection based on a victim’s complaint that the defendant committed a crime as defined 
by New York’s penal law, the discretion ultimately lies with the prosecutor as to whether 
or not to pursue the criminal charges, and a criminal order of protection will only remain in 
place if the defendant is convicted of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  N.Y. Crim. P. 
L. 530.12(14) (McKinney 2003).  This seems particularly troubling for victims of certain 
crimes such as sex assault, stalking, and other violent crime.  This may be especially true 
for crimes where proof may not be strong enough to sustain a criminal case, but would pass 
a lower burden.  Some states have made efforts to provide civil orders of protections 
specific to sex assault victims, while others provide protection to any persons so long as 
imminent danger exists, or where a person is in reasonable fear of another.  See infra, note 
182; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-14-102 (2003) (permitting any municipal court, county court, or 
district court to issue civil orders of protection to a person whose health or safety is in 
“imminent danger” from another, but a lapse of time between an act of abuse or threat and 
filing of the petition is not dispositive).
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available to two separate sets of victims: those who are entitled to 
jurisdiction in family court because they were a victim of a “family offense” 
by a member of the same family or household, and those who are not 
entitled to jurisdiction in family court because they do not satisfy one or 
both of those definitions.  It will examine the procedures and benefits of the 
civil order of protection as well as the “family offense” and standard 
criminal orders of protection.
A.  Victims entitled to jurisdiction in family court
Only a victim who can show she was a victim of a ‘family offense” 
at the hands of a member of the same “family or household” is entitled to 
jurisdiction in family court.  These victims are entitled both to civil orders 
of protection in family court and, if criminal charges are pending, to “family 
offense” orders of protection in criminal court.  “Family offenses” include 
the following crimes, which are in turn defined by New York Penal law96: 
disorderly conduct,97 harassment in the first98 and second degree,99
aggravated harassment in the second degree100, menacing in the second101
and third degree,102 reckless endangerment,103 assault in the second104 and 
third degree105, attempted assault,106 stalking in the first,107 second,108
96
 N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 812; N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 511.11 (McKinney 2003).
97
 However, disorderly conduct is not limited to public conduct, but also includes 
disorderly conduct not in a public place.  Id.  Disorderly conduct is defined in N.Y. Penal 
Law § 240.20 (McKinney 2001).
98
 N.Y. Penal Law § 240.25 (McKinney 2001).
99
 N.Y. Penal Law § 240.26 (McKinney 2001).
100
 N.Y. Penal Law § 240.30 (McKinney 2001).
101
 N.Y. Penal Law § 120.14 (McKinney 2001).
102
 N.Y. Penal Law § 120.15 (McKinney 2001).
103
 N.Y. Penal Law § 120.20-.25 (McKinney 2001).
104
 N.Y. Penal Law § 120.05 (McKinney 2001).
105
 N.Y. Penal Law § 120.00 (McKinney 2001).
106
 N.Y. Penal Law § 120.15 (McKinney 2001).
107
 N.Y. Penal Law § 120.60 (McKinney 2001).
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third,109 and fourth110 degree.  “Members of the same family or household” 
include “persons related by consanguinity or affinity; persons legally 
married to one another; persons formerly married to one another; and 
persons who have a child in common regardless whether such persons have 
been married or have lived together at any time.” 111
1. Civil Orders of Protection in Family Court
A victim must file a petition in family court to obtain a civil order of 
protection.  She must show that the respondent engaged in conduct that 
constituted one of the delineated offenses, and must show that she is a 
member of the same family or household by showing she is a spouse, 
former spouse, parent, child, or that she shares a child with the 
respondent.112
If the abuser commits a crime other than one of the delineated 
“family offenses,” such as a sex crime, first degree assault, kidnapping, 
criminal mischief, etc., she can seek neither a civil order of protection, nor a 
“family offense” criminal order of protection even if she is married to the 
abuser, has children with him, or is otherwise a “family or household” 
member of the abuser’s.  Her only remedy in such a situation is to proceed 
in criminal court, and to obtain a “non family offense” criminal order of 
protection.113
A victim may obtain a temporary order of protection, which, after a 
final hearing, can be made “permanent.”114  The court can require the abuser 
to do the following: stay away from the home, school, business, or place of 
108
 N.Y. Penal Law § 120.55 (McKinney 2001).
109
 N.Y. Penal Law § 120.50 (McKinney 2001).
110
 N.Y. Penal Law § 120.45 (McKinney 2001).
111
 N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 812; N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.11 (McKinney 2003).
112
 N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 821 (McKinney 2001).
113 See infra section C.2.
114
 Once issued, a “permanent” order remains in place for two years unless aggravating 
circumstances are present.  If such circumstances are present, an order will remain in place 
for five years.  N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act. § 842 (McKinney 2001).  Aggravating circumstances 
include the following:  physical injury; the use of a dangerous instrument; a history of 
repeated violations; prior convictions for crimes against the petitioner; or “like incidents.”
N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act. § 828(3) (McKinney 2001).
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employment of any other party; permit a parent entitled to visitation by an 
existing order to visit the child; to permit a party to enter the residence to 
remove personal belongings; to refrain from committing a family offense, 
or any criminal offense against the child or against the other parent or 
against any person to whom custody is awarded, or from harassing 
intimidating or threatening such persons;115 to refrain from acts creating an 
unreasonable risk to health, safety or welfare of a child;116 to pay counsel 
and other fees in connection with the petition; to require the abuser to 
participate in a batterer’s education program, which may include drug and 
alcohol counseling; to provide medical care or pay for expenses; and to 
observe “other conditions as are necessary to further the purposes of 
protection.”117  The order can also include provisions for child support, 
custody and visitation, and provisions revoking any existing license to 
posses a gun.118
If the abuser violates the order, the victim has a few choices.  First, 
she could call the police.  A police officer is required to arrest where an 
officer has probable cause to believe that an abuser has committed a felony 
against a “family or household member, regardless of whether an order of 
protection is in place.”119  An officer is also required to arrest if there is 
115
 While the Family Court Act usually allows for additional provisions not delineated 
in the statute relating to orders of protection in criminal court, the parallel provision in 
criminal court reads:  “to refrain from committing a family offense . . . or any criminal 
offense against the child or against the family or household member, or against any person 
to who custody of the child is awarded, or from harassing, intimidating or threatening such 
persons.  N.Y. Crim. P. Law. § 530.12(c) (McKinney 2003).  This seems to provide an 
additional protection to victims in criminal court that is not explicitly available in family 
court.  As a result, while married or formerly married victims who do not share a child with 
the abuser are entitled to protection in criminal court from any crime as well as acts of 
harassment, intimidation or threats, in family court, they are entitled only to protection 
from future family offenses.
116
 This provision is similar to the last.  The parallel provision in criminal court reads: 
“to refrain from acts of commission or omission that create an unreasonable risk to the 
health, safety and welfare of a child, family or household member’s life or health.”  N.Y. 
Crim. P. Law § 530.12(1)(a)(d) (McKinney).  Once again, this seems to provide an 
additional protection to victims in criminal court that is not explicitly available in family 
court.
117
 N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 842(1) (McKinney 2003).
118
 N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 828(4), § 842-a (McKinney 2001).
119
 N.Y. Crim. P. 140.10(4)(a) (McKinney 2003).  Also outside the context of 
protection orders, an officer has discretion to arrest an abuser if he has reasonable cause to 
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probable cause to believe that an abuser has violated the provisions of a 
valid order of a family offense order of protection.120  A police officer must 
also arrest if a duly served order of protection includes a “stay away” 
provision that the abuser violated, or where the abuser commits another
“family offense” against the family or household member.121  The 
provisions relating to an officer’s ability to arrest without a warrant where 
an abuser violates the provisions of an order of protection apply only to 
“family offense” orders of protection issued in family or criminal court.  
They do not apply to orders of protection issued in criminal court to victims 
of crime who are not members of the abusers “family or household.”122
But, immediate arrest is not a victim’s only option.  She can also 
return to family court to file a civil “violation of court order” petition, or 
contempt petition.123  If the violation also constituted a “family offense,” 
she can initiate an entirely new family offense proceeding in family 
believe the abuser has committed a misdemeanor “family offense” against a family or 
household member, but the officer is directed to determine the primary aggressor, and is to 
avoid dual arrests.  Also, if an abuser commits a misdemeanor family offense against a 
family or household member, and the officer elects not to arrest, the officer is required to 
make a report of investigation on a standardized form that the police department must keep 
on file for four years following the incident that lead to the investigation.  Id.  This 
procedure is not required if the victim is not one of a “family offense,” and is not a “family 
or household member” of the abusers.  Id.  For a discussion of the wisdom of mandatory 
arrest policies, compare Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly:  Intimate Abuse and the 
Violence of State Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 550 (1999) (arguing that mandatory 
intervention inflicts its own form of violence on victims, that it ignores a victim’s 
perspective, and works to rob a victim of even more power); Erin L. Han, note Mandatory 
Arrest and No Drop Policies:  Victim Empowerment in Domestic Violence Cases, 23 B.C. 
THIRD WORLD L. J. 159, 179-181 (2003) (arguing that mandatory arrest policies can be 
parallel with the goal of empowering victims).
120
 N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 168(1) (McKinney 2003).  
121
 N.Y. Crim. P. § 140.10(4)(b) (McKinney 2003).
122
 N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 140.10(4)(b) (McKinney 2003).
123
 N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act. § 846-a (McKinney 2001).  At a contempt hearing in family 
court, the court need only be “satisfied by competent proof” that the abuser violated the 
order’s terms.  N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 846-a (McKinney 2003).  Upon a finding that the 
abuser willfully failed to obey a court order, the family court may modify the order, issue a 
new order, order the forfeiture of bail, order payment of reasonable counsel fees, require 
the respondent surrender any guns, and commit respondent to jail for up to six months for 
each violation.  N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 847 (McKinney 2003).  
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court.124  Or, if she chooses, she can ask the district attorney to file a 
complaint in criminal court instead of, or as well as, filing a complaint in 
family court.125  Finally, she can also ask the district attorney to file a 
complaint for criminal contempt,126 or ask the court to invoke its own 
powers to punish for contempt.127  Essentially, the victim has the option of 
treating the violation as a new criminal offense, a civil contempt 
proceeding, a criminal contempt proceeding, or all three.128
2. Criminal Orders of Protection: “Protection for victims of Family 
offenses” 
New York has two separate criminal protection order statutes: one 
entitled the “protection for victims of “family offenses,”129 and one entitled 
“offenses other than family offenses,“130
A victim of a “family offense” at the hands of a member of her 
“family or household” has the right to proceed “directly and without court 
referral in either a criminal or family court, or both.”131  Simultaneous or 
subsequent cases may proceed in both places.  To obtain a “family offense” 
order of protection in criminal court, a victim must show she is a victim of 
124
 N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 847 (McKinney 2003).
125
 N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 847
126 See N.Y. Penal Law §§ 215.50 – 215.51 (McKinney 2003).  Repeat violations of 
family offense orders of protection results in increased penalties for criminal contempt.  
Where a defendant has been convicted of contempt within the previous five years and 
violates a “family offense” order of protection issued either by family or criminal court, the 
misdemeanor contempt crime is elevated to a class “E” felony.  N.Y. Penal Law § 215.51 
(McKinney 2003).  This same provision does not apply to non family orders of protection.
127
 N.Y. Jud. Law § 750, 751 (McKinney 2003).  These powers are separate from 
criminal contempt charges.  The court has the power to impose prison for up to three 
months, and can impose a fine for one thousand dollars; these contempt penalties should 
not reduce any sentence for any original offense of which the defendant is also found 
guilty.  N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 512(10) (McKinney 2003).  
128
 N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 847 (McKinney 2003).  However, there may be concerns of 
double jeopardy where identical contempt proceedings are pursued in both family and 
criminal court.  U.S. v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
129
 N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.12 (McKinney 2003).
130
 N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.13 (McKinney 2003).
131
 N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.11(2)(i) (McKinney 2003).
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one of the delineated family offenses at the hands of someone from her 
same family or household.  
Like civil orders of protection, if an abuser commits a crime that is 
not included in the relatively short list of “family offenses,” her remedy is 
to seek a “non family offense” order of protection in criminal court.  Such 
orders do not provide the same levels of protection or provisions as family 
offense orders of protection.
If she is a victim of crime by a family or household member, she 
may file a complaint with the criminal court, with the police, or with the 
prosecutor’s office alleging that a defendant has committed a “family 
offense.”132  But, the victim is not in charge of this proceeding.  Instead, it is 
only the police or prosecutor’s office that may investigate, file charges and 
arrest the abuser.133  The prosecutor may decide not to proceed with the case 
and has discretion to dismiss the case.134
In connection with the criminal case, the prosecutor may request that 
the court may issue an order of protection.135  The order will be in effect 
while the prosecution is pending, and for the period during which a case is 
adjourned pending dismissal.136
132 See, e.g., N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 100.15 (McKinney 2003).  This statute allows any 
person having knowledge of the commission of the offense charged to file an information 
with the court.  However, only district attorneys "retain the ultimate nondelegable 
responsibility for prosecuting all crimes and offenses."  People v. Soddano,  665 N.E.2d 
161 (N.Y. 1995) But see, People v. Van Sickle, 192 N.E.2d 9 (N.Y. 1963) (upholding 
conviction led by a lay complainant).  To constitute a complaint sufficient for arrest, a 
complaint must establish reasonable cause to believe that a crime has been committed.  To 
constitute a sufficient information, it must also contain non-hearsay evidentiary allegations 
to establish every element of the offense alleged.  See N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 100.40.  While 
this procedure is available for victims, it is rarely used.  Instead, the victim typically files a 
complaint with the police.  Interview with Andrew Seewald, Assistant District Attorney, 
Manhattan District Attorney’s Office (Oct. 6, 2003).
133
 N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 120.10-.90 (McKinney 2003).
134
 The decision is always the government’s as to whether and how to proceed with a 
criminal action.  See, e.g., N.Y. Crim. P. Law. § 530.12(14) (“The people shall make 
reasonable efforts to notify the complainant alleging a crime constituting a family offense 
when the people have decided to decline prosecution of such crime, to dismiss the criminal 
charges against the defendant or to enter into a plea agreement.”)  
135
 N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.12 (McKinney 2003).
136
 Unlike other offenses, the time for adjournment of “family offenses” contemplating 
dismissal is one year instead of the standard six months for other types of offenses.  N.Y. 
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The terms of the order can include any or all of the following: orders 
for the defendant to stay away from the victim; orders enforcing an existing 
child visitation order; orders restraining the defendant from committing any 
family offense, any crime against a family or household member, or any 
harassing, intimidating or threatening acts against such persons;137 orders 
restraining the defendant from committing acts creating an unreasonable 
risk to the health safety or welfare of a child or family or household 
member; orders to allow a party to enter the shared residence to obtain 
belongings;138 and orders that the defendant surrender licenses to carry or 
posses guns, and the guns themselves.139
In contrast to family court civil orders of protection, the criminal 
court does not have jurisdiction to enter new orders regarding child custody, 
support, or visitation, and there are no specific provisions for restitution, 
payment of counsel and other fees, probation before conviction, medical 
care expenses, batterer intervention programs, or drug and alcohol 
counseling.140
Unlike proceedings in family court, which require only proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence, to remain in place, a “permanent” criminal 
order of protection can only be issued if the underlying crime is proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.141
If a defendant violates a “family offense” criminal order of 
Crim. P. Law § 170.55(2) (McKinney 2003).
137
 N.Y. Crim. P. Law. § 530.11
138
 N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.12(1)(a-e).  The court may also issue a temporary 
protection order ex parte upon the filing of a criminal complaint and for good cause shown.  
§ 530.12(3).
139
 N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.14 (McKinney 2003).  
140 Compare N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.12(1)(a-e) with N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 842(1)(a-i) 
(McKinney 2003).
141
 N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.12(5).  However, to enter the order, the court must state 
on the record the reasons for issuing or not issuing an order of protection.  Id.  Upon 
conviction, if the court decides to keep the protection order in place, it must fix the order’s 
time of duration.  In felony actions, the order can remain in effect for up to five years from 
the date of conviction, or three years from the date of the expiration of the maximum term 
of an indeterminate sentence or the term of a determinate sentence of imprisonment 
actually imposed.  Id.  For misdemeanor actions, the duration cannot exceed three years 
from the date of conviction.  Id.  In other offenses, the duration of the order cannot exceed 
one year from the conviction’s date.  Id.
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protection, the victim here also has several options.  First, she can call the 
police.  Like violations of civil orders of protection, police officers have the 
authority to arrest for violations of family offense criminal orders of 
protection without a warrant, and in some circumstances are required to do 
so.142
Second, if an abuser commits another family offense in violation of 
the criminal order of protection, the victim has the option of proceeding in 
family court, criminal court, or both.  She may file a new family offense 
proceeding in family court and obtain a new civil order of protection.  Or, 
just like in violations of civil orders of protection, she may file civil 
contempt proceedings in family court.143  She may also request that the 
prosecutor file criminal contempt charges, that the court invoke its criminal 
contempt penalty powers,144 or that the court to exercise its powers under 
the criminal order of protection statute.
B.  Procedures for all other victims: the standard criminal order of 
protection 
A victim of a crime other than a “family offense” is barred from 
protection in civil court, and is barred from seeking a family offense order 
of protection in criminal court.  The only remedy such victims have is to 
obtain a standard criminal protection order in criminal court.145  Unlike 
family offense victims, victims entitled to protection for other offenses are 
not limited by the nature of the crime that the defendant committed; they 
can receive an order of protection for any “pending” criminal action.146
Other than the entitlement definitions, the procedure for obtaining a 
standard order of protection is identical to the family offense criminal 
orders.  A victim may file a complaint alleging that a defendant has 
committed a crime.147  But, again, the victim is not in charge of this 
proceeding.  The prosecutor may decide not to proceed with the case and 
has discretion to dismiss the case.
142
 N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 140.10 (McKinney 2003).
143 See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
144 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
145
 N.Y. Crim. P. Law. § 530.13. (McKinney 2003).
146 Id.
147 See, e.g., N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 100.15 (McKinney 2003).
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Like family offense protection orders, the court can issue a 
temporary order of protection ex parte without waiting for the abuser’s 
arrest and, upon a showing of good cause, the court can issue the order as 
soon as the accusatory instrument is filed.148  Temporary orders can also be 
issued at other times throughout the proceeding, including when the matter 
is adjourned in contemplation of dismissal.149  The order will be in effect 
while the prosecution is pending, and for the period during which a case is 
adjourned pending dismissal.150
The terms of a standard criminal order of protection are even more 
limited than “family offense” criminal orders of protection.  The only 
remedies specifically sanctioned by statute are “stay away” orders, and 
orders restraining the defendant from “harassing, intimidating, threatening 
or otherwise interfering with the victim or victims of the offense and such 
members of the family or household of such victim.”151 The court can also 
include orders restraining the defendant from buying or owning guns.152
But, there are no provisions for restitution, payment of medical expenses, 
provisions requiring a party access to personal belongings, provisions 
providing for probation before conviction, batterer intervention programs, 
or drug and alcohol counseling.153
Even more problematic, however, a victim of a crime other than a 
“family offense” may share a child with the defendant.  The standard order 
of protection does not specifically allow for orders enforcing existing 
visitation orders or for restraining the defendant from committing acts 
creating an unreasonable risk to the health safety or welfare of a child.154
148
 N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.13(2) (McKinney 2003).
149
 N.Y. Crim. P. Law §§ 170.55(3)-(4), 530.12(1) (McKinney 2003).
150
 But, unlike a “family offense” case where the time for adjournment contemplating 
dismissal is one year, the time for all other crimes is six months.  N.Y. Crim. P. Law 
§ 170.55(2) (McKinney 2003).
151
 N.Y. Crim. P. Law. § 530.13.
152
 N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.14.
153 Compare N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.12(1)(a-e) and N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act. § 842 
(McKinney 2003).
154 Compare N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.12(1)(b), (d).  The court may also issue a 
temporary protection order ex parte upon the filing of a criminal complaint and for good 
cause shown.  § 530.12(3).
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While the court has authority to issue “other conditions,” it is usually 
unwilling to depart too far from the delineated provisions.  Also, it does not 
have jurisdiction to issue orders regarding child custody or visitation.  
Additionally, the court uses pre-printed forms and may not take the time to 
become adequately informed about the circumstances of the parties because 
it does not involve a “family offense.” 155
For a standard order to remain “permanent,” and assuming the 
defendant does not plead guilty, a defendant must be convicted of the 
underlying charge by proof proved beyond a reasonable doubt.156  But, 
unlike a victim of a “family offense,” who has the option of proceeding also 
in family court, a victim of any other crime has no alternative or additional 
means of protection.157
Where a defendant violates a standard criminal order of protection, 
the victim can call the police.  But, unlike family offense order violations 
that mandate arrest and arrest without a warrant, whether police can arrest 
without a warrant a defendant who violates a standard order is unclear.158
The victim may also request that the prosecutor file criminal contempt 
155
 N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act. § 812(4) (McKinney 2003)(requiring the chief administrator of 
the courts to “prescribe an appropriate form to implement” the provisions of the law.); See,
Criminal Court Non-Family Offense Order of Protection Form, available at: 
http://forms.lp.findlaw.com/form/courtforms/state/ny/ny000013.pdf (2003).  The pre-
printed form has only one line for “other conditions” as the court specifies.  Also, in New 
York, family offense and non-family offenses cases are treated differently in criminal 
court, which will be discussed in more detail below.
156
 N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.13(4) (McKinney 2003).
157
 Upon a defendant’s conviction, if the court decides to keep the protection order in 
place, it fixes the order’s time of duration.  The terms of duration are identical to the 
“family offense” provisions: in felony actions, five years from conviction, or three from the 
date the sentence ends; in misdemeanor actions, three years from the date of conviction; 
and for other offenses, one year from the conviction’s date.  N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530(5) 
(McKinney 2003).
158
 The non family offense statute provides that “the presentation of a copy of [an] 
order . . . to any police officer . . . shall constitute authority for him to arrest a person who 
has violated the terms of such order.”  N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.13(6) (McKinney 2003).  
However, the statute delineating when officers may arrest without a warrant specifically 
states that only violators of orders issued in family court and those issued pursuant to the 
“family offense” provisions in criminal court are eligible for warrantless arrests.  N.Y. 
Crim. P. 140.10(4)(b) (McKinney 2003).  In any case, it is certainly clear that there are no 
mandatory arrest provisions that apply to violators of standard orders.  
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charges159 or that the court invoke its criminal contempt penalty powers.160
But, under any of these remedies, it is the government, not the victim, who 
is in control of the proceedings.161
Finally, upon a violation, like violations of family offense criminal 
orders, the court may revoke a defendant’s firearms license, order him 
ineligible for such licenses, and order the defendant to surrender firearms if 
there is a substantial risk that he may use or threaten to use them against the 
victim.162  The court is required to take action regarding firearms where the 
defendant’s willful failure to obey the order resulted in a serious physical 
injury, the use or threatened use of a deadly weapon, or behavior 
constituting any violent offense.163
IV.  THE BENEFITS OF CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS 
In New York and in other states as well, civil orders of protection 
provide unique benefits and remedies to domestic violence victims that are 
in addition to, or that are in place of, the benefits the criminal system offers.  
First, in other states generally, and in New York in particular, civil orders 
provide procedural benefits that the criminal system does not.  They may be 
a preferable option for victims who may not have evidence strong enough to 
sustain a criminal case.  Second, civil orders provide emotional or other 
intangible benefits unavailable in criminal court.  They help empower a 
victim by giving her a choice of remedy, and they may be preferable to 
those who do not want the abuser to face criminal consequences, but simply 
want the violence to end.  Third, at least some evidence suggests that they 
159
 N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.13(8) (McKinney 2003).  If a defendant violates a 
standard order of protection, a victim may ask the prosecutor to file misdemeanor criminal 
contempt charges, or if injury or property damage was involved, she may request the 
prosecutor file felony criminal contempt charges.  But, unlike “family offense” orders of 
protection, repeat violators of a standard criminal order of protection will not incur any 
greater penalty.  N.Y. Penal Law § 215.51.  Instead, unlike repeat violations of family 
offense orders, which are at least class E felonies, each new violation of a standard criminal 
order is simply a class A misdemeanor.  N.Y. Penal Law § 215.50 (McKinney 2003).  
160
 N.Y. Jud. Law § 751 (McKinney 2003).
161
 But, unlike in family offense orders where the government must make “reasonable 
efforts to notify” the victim of any of their decisions regarding the case, there is no 
comparable provision requiring the government to consult with or notify other victims of 
similar decisions.  See, e.g., N.Y. Crim. P. Law. § 530.12(14) (McKinney 2003).
162
 N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.14(3)(b) (McKinney 2003).
163
 N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.14(3)(b) (McKinney 2003).
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do work to reduce or at least deter future acts of violence.  Finally, civil 
orders and their procedures work to prevent future violence from escalating 
further.  While most studies and criticisms about civil orders of protection 
have measured and discussed whether orders of protection “work” by only 
focusing on whether they prevent future acts of violence, civil orders of 
protection work in several other ways, as well, and these benefits are often 
either discounted or ignored.164  All domestic violence victims should have 
equal access to the unique benefits that civil orders of protection provide.
A.  Procedural and Other Benefits Generally
Civil protection orders provide unique procedural and other benefits 
apart from simply forestalling future violence.  First, they are easier to 
obtain than a criminal conviction and criminal orders of protection.  A 
lower standard of proof applies, and in most states, a victim need only 
sustain proof by a preponderance of the evidence rather than proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  A victim may not have the evidence necessary to sustain 
criminal charges, but does have evidence to support a finding that she is in 
future danger under a lower burden of proof.  Also, civil orders can provide 
protection more quickly than those granted in the criminal system.  In civil 
court, a temporary order can be issued upon the victim’s sworn statement,165
or a hearing can be held in a short time.  In contrast, while a temporary 
order can be granted in criminal cases in relatively short order, a conviction 
and “permanent” order can take months, or even years.166
Second, civil protection orders empower the victim.  They can have 
a positive effect on the emotional well-being of victims who obtain them by 
giving them choices of remedy.  This serves to give victims control over 
both their cases and, more importantly, their lives.167 It also gives control 
164 See Cahn & Meier, supra note 14 at 347.
165 Kit Kinports & Karla Fischer, supra note 49 at 165.
166
 Even in courts committed to handling domestic violence cases aggressively, the 
average period of delay between filing to disposition in criminal court stretches from six to 
eight months.  Buzawa E. & Hotaling G., Klein A., & Byrne, J. Response to Domestic 
Violence in a Pro-Active Court Setting:  Final Report, Washington, D.C., National Institute 
of Justice (June 1999).
167 See, Susan Keilitz, Paula L. Hannaford, & Hillery S. Efkeman, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Civil Protection Orders:  The Benefits and Limitations for Victims of Domestic 
Violence (1998), in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: FROM A PRIVATE MATTER TO A FEDERAL 
OFFENSE:  THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM’S RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 3, 49 (Paul 
Finkelsman ed., 1998).  For a discussion on the importance of empowering victims of 
domestic violence, see, Martha Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1411, 
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back to a victim who may otherwise be in a powerless situation.168  In 
criminal cases, the decision is always the government’s as to whether and 
how to proceed.169  But, in a civil action, the victim can choose when and 
where to file, and she can seek remedies specific to her situation.  Further, 
once the order is in place, where an abuser violates the order’s terms, a 
victim has the choice whether or not to enforce the order by either calling 
the police,170 or, in many jurisdictions, to file a contempt petition.171  In a 
contempt proceeding, a victim can often request a warrant for the abuser’s 
arrest.172  If the court finds that the abuser violated the order, a victim can 
usually request additional relief, and she can even request that the abuser 
serve time in jail for his contumacious conduct.173
In this way, the victim, rather than the state, is in control over what 
happens to her.  Studies show that this type of empowerment affects a 
victim’s sense of well-being.  In one, 72% of women who obtained 
protection orders reported life improvements.  After six months, that 
number goes up to 85%, and more than 90% reported an increase in 
1420-21  (1993).
168
 One of Lenore Walker’s groundbreaking works about domestic violence discusses 
that the dynamic of battering relationships includes dominance, power, and control.  
Lenore Walker, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, (1984).
169 See, e.g., N.Y. Crim. P. Law. § 530.12(14) (“The people shall make reasonable 
efforts to notify the complainant alleging a crime constituting a family offense when the 
people have decided to decline prosecution of such crime, to dismiss the criminal charges 
against the defendant or to enter into a plea agreement.”)
170
 Police are more likely to respond where a victim has an order of protection; this 
should serve to empower the victim even further.  See, infra note 201 and accompanying 
text.
171
 Many states also allow pro se contempt proceedings. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§ 50B-4 (2003) (“A party may file a motion for contempt for violation of any order . . . .  
This party may file and proceed with that motion pro se, using forms provided by the clerk 
of superior court or a magistrate”).  For a discussion of the benefits of criminal contempt 
proceedings for victims of domestic violence see David M. Zlotnick, Empowering the 
Battered Woman:  The Use of Criminal Contempt Sanctions to Enforce Civil Protection 
Orders, 56 OHIO ST. L. J. 1153 (1995).
172 See, e.g., W. Va. Code § 48- 27-902 (2003); Miss. Code Ann. § 518B.01(14)(b) 
(2003).
173 See, e.g., W. Va. Code § 48- 27-902 (2003); Miss. Code Ann. § 518B.01(14)(b) 
(2003); Miss. Code Ann. § 93-21-21 (2003).
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emotional well-being and security.174 Other studies have resulted in similar 
findings.175
Further, civil orders of protection are far more complete than the 
remedies available in criminal court.  Civil orders can provide relief in the 
form of child custody, child visitation, and other child-care economic 
orders.176  They can also require that an abuser enter drug, alcohol, anger-
management or batterer’s education counseling, and that the abuser 
surrender firearms.  They can order possession and use of shared residences, 
automobiles, or other personal effects or that the abuser vacate a shared 
residence or the residence of another party.177  They can also require that the 
abuser pay the mortgage or rent on the victim’s residence, and pay for 
victim’s counsel.178  They can order that the abuser pay for expenses related 
to the violence such as medical expenses, counseling expenses, temporary 
shelter or housing expenses, and expenses to repair or replace damaged 
property.179  Also, most states have a catch-all provision that allows courts 
discretion to fashion additional remedies specific to each victim.180  In 
contrast, statutes governing orders of protection issued in criminal court are 
usually limited in their remedies, or at least they do not delineate with the 
174
 Keilitz, Hannaford & Efkeman, supra note 167 at 55.
175
 Karla Fischer & Mary Rose, When "Enough is Enough": Battered Women's 
Decision Making Around Court Orders of Protection, 41 CRIME & DELINQ. 414, 417 
(1995); Horton, et al., supra note 192 at 274; Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic 
Violence, Protection From Abuse Orders, 2 (February, 1998) (citing a 1994 National 
Center for State Courts study reporting that 80% of the women who received civil orders of 
protection felt safer.) (available at 
http://www.pcadv.org/publications/FactSheets/PFAs.pdf).
176 See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13- 14-102(15)(e)(I – III) (2003) (Allows court to award 
temporary care and control of any minor children of either party involved for a period of 
not more than one hundred twenty days); Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(5) (2003); Md. Code Ann., 
Family § 4-506(7)-(8) (2003).
177 See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-14-102(15)(a), (d) (2003); Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(2) 
(2003); Md. Code Ann., Family § 4-506(3), (12) (2003).
178 See, e.g., Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(2) (2003)
179 Id.; Md. Code Ann., Family § 4-506(4) (2003)
180 See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 18.66.100(c)(16) (Michie 2003) providing that a protection 
order may “order other relief the court determines necessary to protect the petitioner or any 
household member”; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-14-102 (2003) (stating that a court may issue an 
order of protection with “such other relief as the court deems appropriate.”)
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amount of detail the relief that the court is entitled to provide.  Also, the 
forms courts use to issue orders of protection are usually pre-printed, and 
only have small sections available to allow a court to add provisions.181
Some states simply do not provide criminal orders of protection to those 
who do not fall within the state’s definition of domestic violence victims.182
Civil protection orders can serve to align more closely the interests 
of the state with those of the victim.  This can serve several goals.  First, it 
may increase a victim’s participation in the case.  In many cases, victims do 
not wish their abusers to face criminal charges for a multitude of reasons.  
She may need the abusers continued financial support, she may simply want 
the violence to end, but not the relationship, or she may fear retaliation 
stemming from criminal charges.183  She may seek the broader remedies 
that civil court offers, and can choose to avoid the punitive sanctions 
imposed in a criminal proceeding.  In this way, a civil order of protection 
can allow a victim to use, and ultimately trust the court system to protect 
and follow her interests to help end the violence.  
Second, when provided with an additional public remedy such as a 
civil order of protection, a victim’s interests are aligned with the state’s.  
States criminalized domestic violence in part to bring it into the “public” 
forum and to send a message to abusers that domestic violence is 
unacceptable.  Also, because the state prosecutes criminal sanctions, more 
force is brought to bear on the message.  Civil remedies can send these 
same messages.  A victim’s choice to obtain an order of protection in a 
181 See, e.g. Criminal Court Non-Family Offense Order of Protection Form, available 
at: http://forms.lp.findlaw.com/form/courtforms/state/ny/ny000013.pdf (2003).  The pre-
printed form has only one line for “other conditions” as the court specifies.
182
  Illinois, for instance, does not have a specific statute allowing the court to issue 
criminal orders of protection in connection with an ongoing criminal case.  See, e.g., 720 Il. 
Comp. Stat. § 5/12-30 (2003).   A prosecutor may seek a protection order in criminal court 
under the bail statute.  725 Il. Comp. Stat. § 5/110-10.  However, Illinois’ definition of 
family and household members for purposes of the domestic violence civil orders of 
protection is one of the most expansive, and includes both cohabitants and members of 
dating relationships.  But, a former stepchild does not meet the definition, nor does a victim 
of stranger sex assault.  Illinois recently passed a separate civil statute, effective in January 
of 2004, which will allow victims of sexual assault to seek a civil order of protection 
regardless of their former relationship with the assailant.  740 Il. Comp. Stat. § 22/213 
(2003).
183
 Peter Finn, Statutory Authority in the Use and Enforcement of Civil Protection 
Orders Against Domestic Abuse, 23 FAM. L. Q. 43, 44-45 (1989) (discussing reasons why a 
victim may not want her abuser to face criminal charges).
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public court, and the court’s issuance of that order, sends the message that 
the violence is unacceptable.  Additionally, a victim seeking sanctions 
because of an order’s violation, and the police or court’s issuance of those 
sanctions, can send a stronger public social message that domestic violence 
is intolerable.184
Civil orders of protection may also be cheaper than criminal 
remedies, both for victims and the courts.185  Unlike a criminal case where a 
defendant may be arrested and jailed, civil orders allow a victim to obtain 
protection while allowing the abuser to keep his job and continue providing 
economic support.186  A civil protection order hearing will often be less 
time consuming for the victim, and less expensive for the state than criminal 
proceedings.187  A temporary civil order of protection is typically granted 
after a victim files a sworn statement, and a permanent order is granted after 
the court holds a short factual hearing.  In contrast, criminal trials can be 
lengthy, expensive, and slow. 
C.  Procedural Benefits Particular to New York
New York’s civil orders of protection offer many unique benefits 
that its criminal system cannot.  First, permanent orders of protection are 
obtainable under a lower burden of proof than permanent civil orders.188  In 
obtaining a disposition in family court, the victim is permitted to introduce 
hearsay and other “material and relevant” evidence that would not be 
permissible in criminal court.189
Second, the remedies available in a civil order are far more complete 
than the remedies available in a criminal one.  Criminal courts in New York 
cannot issue orders relating to child custody, support, or visitation.  The 
184
 For a discussion of the distinction between the “public” and “private” spheres, and 
its affect on victims of domestic violence, see, Elizabeth Schneider, The Violence of 
Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973 (1991).  Professor Schneider argues that masculine 
concepts of privacy permit and encourage violence against women.  She suggest that one 
way to break down the barriers between the public and private realm is to allow victims 
“public” civil remedies for their “private” abuses.  Id.
185
 Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 21 at 237.
186 Kit Kinports & Karla Fischer, supra note 49 at 165.
187
 Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 21 at 237.
188
 N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 832 (McKinney 2003).
189
 N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act. § 834 (McKinney 2003).
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protection order statutes in criminal court, particularly as to “non family 
offense” orders, limit the remedy available to stay away orders and orders 
that restrain the defendant from committing acts of harassment, threats or 
intimidation.190  They do not include provisions for payment of medical 
fees, restitution, attorney fees, batterer education programs, or drug and 
alcohol counseling.  
Third, a victim has remedies at her disposal that are unavailable in 
criminal court if an abuser violates a civil order of protection.  In addition 
to, or instead of seeking criminal charges of contempt in criminal court, she 
may seek sanctions against the abuser for civil contempt in family court.  
Here again, lower standards of proof apply, and the victim is not limited to 
evidence that satisfies the rules of admission in criminal court.  If she 
wishes to send a strong message to the abuser even though the family court, 
she may still seek to have him arrested and even jailed for violation of the 
civil order without invoking the punitive measures of criminal court.191
Fourth, if an abuser violates a civil order more than once, he is 
subject to prosecution for felony criminal contempt, a remedy unavailable 
where an abuser repeatedly violates a non family offense criminal order.  
Also, unlike criminal cases, in the family court, the victim, not the 
government, is in charge.  She determines whether, when, and how to 
proceed in her claim.  She also determines whether, when, and how to 
proceed if the order is violated.  In this way, the system returns to a victim 
at least some of her lost power.  Finally, civil orders of protection in New 
York provide the other additional benefits such as emotional empowerment, 
prevention of re-abuse, and prevention of abuse escalation. 
D.    Prevention of Re-Abuse 
There is evidence suggesting that the risk of a victim’s re-abuse 
declines where she obtains a civil protection order.  While three early 
studies all reported that a protection order did not reduce the likelihood of 
subsequent violence,192 more recent studies have reported that filing for a 
190
 N.Y. Crim. P. § 530.13(a) (McKinney 2003).
191
 N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 846(b)(ii)(A-C) (McKinney 2003).
192
 Waul, supra note 6 at 54; Berk, et. al., Mutual Combat and Other Family Violence 
Myths, in THE DARK SIDE OF FAMILIES: CURRENT FAMILY VIOLENCE RESEARCH
(Finkelhor, et al, eds. 1983); Janice Grau, Jeffery Fagen &  Sandra Wexler, Restraining 
Orders for Battered Women: Issues of Access and Efficacy,  in CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
POLITICS AND WOMEN: THE AFTERMATH OF LEGALLY MANDATED CHANGE 13 (Claudine 
Schweber & Clarice Fineman eds. 1985); Anne Horton, Kyriacos, M. Simonidis, & Lucy 
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protection order resulted in a significant reduction in future abuse.  In one, 
the researchers studied thirty women who had obtained protection orders in 
Massachusetts.193  They concluded that among victims who obtained 
temporary protection orders, almost two-thirds were not re-abused within 
the two-month time period following the order’s issuance.194
In another study conducted in 1999, the researchers concluded that 
victims who filed for protection orders experienced a 66% decrease in 
abuse.195  The same study concluded that permanent protection orders 
resulted in a 68% decrease in violence, while temporary protection orders 
resulted in a 52% decrease.196  Most recently, in 2003, another study 
revealed that victims who obtain and maintained civil protection orders 
were safer than those without them in the five-month period after they were 
initially threatened.197  In the four months following that period, the effect 
Simonidis, Legal Remedies for Spousal Abuse: Victim Characteristics, Expectations and 
Satisfaction. 2 J. FAM. VIOL. 265-79 (1987).  However, the Grau study did conclude that 
victims who had fewer injuries before seeking a protection order experienced a slightly 
larger decrease in re-abuse than victims with similar histories who did not obtain protection 
orders.  Grau, at 24 (54 % of victims without protection orders experienced re-abuse, while 
44% with a protection order experienced re-abuse).   But, all victims with serious abuse 
histories were at about the same risk for re-abuse regardless of whether they sought a 
protection order. Id. (68% without protection orders were re-abused, 67% with protection 
orders were re-abused).  The problem with most of these studies is their lack of control 
groups.  As a result, is impossible to know whether the number of victims who were re-
victimized is significantly different from victims who have suffered abuse, but have not 
gotten an order of protection.  Also, while most these studies show that approximately half 
of the victims suffered additional abuse, it is impossible to know whether the half who did 
not suffer re-abuse would have still escaped further abuse had she not received an order of 
protection.
193
 Chaudhuri & Daly, supra note 19 at 230-32.
194 Id.  But, the study also concluded that all of the abusers with prior criminal records 
violated the protection orders.
195
 Michael Carlson, Susan D. Harris & George Holden, Protective Orders and 
Domestic Violence:  Risk Factors for Re-Abuse, 14 J. FAM. VIOL. 205-226 (1999) (the 
study looked at 210 couples who filed protection orders between 1990 and 1992, and who 
also had police records two years before and after the restraining orders).
196 Id.
197
 Victoria Holt, M.A. Kernic, M.E. Wolf, F.P. Rivara, Do Protection Orders Affect 
the Likelihood of Future Partner Violence and Injury?  24 AM. J. OF PREVENTATIVE MED.
16-21 (2003) (the researchers conducted an interview study of 448 women over a period of 
nine months).
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of the protection order had grown, and women who maintained their orders 
were less likely to have been sexually abused or injured, or to have received 
medical care for their abuse.198  While this research is not exhaustive, it 
indicates that protection orders do have an effect on the likelihood that a 
restrained party will re-abuse a petitioner.199
But, while re-abuse is largely the focus of studies on the 
“effectiveness” of civil orders of protection from the perspective of whether 
they prevent future violence, as established above, there are several 
additional arguments for why civil protection orders work in other ways, 
and why they should be available to all victims in addition to criminal 
charges and criminal protection orders.  Few studies address these other 
benefits.
D.  Prevention of Abuse Escalation 
Unlike criminal charges, civil protection orders are forward-looking.  
By focusing on the prevention of future acts of violence, they provide an 
opportunity for the victim, the courts, and the police to prevent violence not 
only from reoccurring, but also from escalating.  Once an order is in place, 
its violation usually constitutes its own criminal offense, or subjects the 
violator to penalties for criminal contempt.  
Also, it should be easier for a victim to overcome the problems of 
ambivalence from prosecutors and police where a protection order is in 
place.200  Most states provide for the warrantless arrest of abusers who 
violate a civil order.  As a result, the police are more likely to arrest,201 and 
198 Id.
199
 For a discussion of the problems with existing methodology of protection order 
efficacy studies, see, Ko, supra note 45 at  e.g., Naomi Cahn, Joan Meier, Domestic 
Violence and Feminist Jurisprudence: Towards a New Agenda, 4 B.U. Pub. Int. L. J. 339 
(1995) (“protection orders frequently do "work"; they often deter further violence and 
empower the victims to make further changes for their own safety. Success stories of this 
kind do not appear in the press because the absence of violence is not considered a 
newsworthy event.”).  
200
 Buzawa et al., supra note 21 at 235.
201
 Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Protection From Abuse 
Orders, 2 (February, 1998) (citing a National Institute of Justice study from 1991 
“reporting that police officers are more likely to arrest a perpetrator who violates a 
protection order than other batterers who commit crimes against family members”) 
(available at http://www.pcadv.org/publications/FactSheets/PFAs.pdf); Chaudhuri & Daly, 
supra note 19 at 235-37 (women who obtained protection orders reported that before 
protection orders were in place, police would not come to their aid nor respond to their 
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prosecutors can prosecute the abuser despite the nature of the violation.202
At least one study has shown that arrests for protection order violations 
reduce the severity of future violence.203
An abuser need not commit an act that would constitute a crime to 
be in violation of a protection order.  Rather, he may fail to vacate a shared 
home or he may contact the victim in violation of a “no-contact” provision.  
In this way, it may be easier to deter an abuser from escalating violent 
conduct.  Further, unlike criminal orders of protection, civil orders can 
provide additional terms unavailable in criminal court, and these may also 
form the bases of violation proceedings.  For instance, the abuser may 
refuse to pay child support or medical benefits in violation of civil order in 
an attempt to intimidate the victim.  Since child support or medical expense 
benefits may be unavailable in a criminal order of protection, the abuser’s 
conduct may result in a new, different type of violation chargeable in 
criminal court as a new crime or as an act of contempt.
Proof of these types of protection order violations may be easier to 
come by than proof that the abuser committed a new, separate crime.204  It 
may be easier for a prosecutor to prove that an abuser contacted a victim or 
failed to vacate a shared residence in violation of an order than it would be 
calls for help, but once in place, police were prompt and supportive when called);  Eve and 
Carl Buzawa have also suggested that police may be more apt to intervene due to the 
possible civil liability that may result if they do not.  Buzawa et al. 21 at 236.  But see,
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (Denying § 
1983 claim for governmental failure to protect stemming from domestic violence.).
202
 This is especially aided by the growth of protection order registries in many states.  
As of 2001, 46 states had protection order registries.  See, Lorrie Montgomery, Internet 
Database for Courts Work to Keep Domestic Violence Victims Safe, (June 25, 2001) 
(available at: http://www.ctc7.net/about_CTC7/media/domestic_violence.htm); See, e.g., 
Cal. Fam. Code § 6380(b) (West 2003) (establishing a Domestic Violence Restraining 
Order Registry); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6105(d) (creating a statewide registry of orders 
of protection).  These help ensure that police officers responding to a scene can determine 
whether an order of protection is in effect and against whom, what the terms of the order 
are, and can allow them more certainty in arresting abusers who violate the terms of an 
existing order.  
203
 Adele Harrell, Barbara Smith, Effects of Restraining Orders on Domestic Violence 
Victims, 234 in DO ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK?  (Buzawa & Buzawa eds. 
1996) (interview study showing that the odds of severe violence in cases in which an arrest 
had been made were less than half that of cases in which no arrest had been made in the 
year following the arrest; however, arrests did not reduce the likelihood of other types of 
less severe abuse from recurring).
204 Id.
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to prove an underlying crime of assault or harassment.  Additionally, in 
several states, repeat violations of civil orders of protection result in 
increased penalties and mandatory jail time.205  Also, several states increase 
penalties for crimes that also violate an existing protection order.206
Obviously, to take advantage of these increased penalties for its violation, a 
civil order of protection must first be in place.  Where studies indicate that 
serious acts of violence are preceded by a history of less serious offenses,207
the threat and use of the penalties associated with protection order 
violations can serve as an additional deterrence to violence escalation, and 
can allow the protective powers of the state to aid a victim before she is 
subject to more serious assaults.
E.  Conclusion
Civil orders of protection provide benefits to domestic violence 
victims that are apart from and in addition to the remedies and protections 
available in criminal court.  The civil system in both New York and in other 
states offer procedural advantages, such as lower burdens of proof, remedies 
specific to the circumstances of domestic violence victims, and increased or 
additional criminal or civil penalties for abusers who violate them.  Also, 
civil orders can be effective in reducing and deterring future abuse and 
future escalation.  Finally, civil orders provide intangible benefits that are 
205 See, e.g., 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/12-30 9 (2001) (makes repeated violations of civil 
protection orders a class four felony); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 25.07 (Vernon 2000) (a 
conviction for protection order violation the third time is a class three felony, as is a 
violation of a protection order by assault or stalking); Wash. Rev. Code § 26.50.110 (2003) 
(makes violation of protection order the third time a class C felony regardless of whether 
the previous convictions involved the same victim); Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 586-11 (2003) 
(imposing minimum forty-eight hours jail for first offense, and minimum of thirty days for 
the second); Iowa Code § 236.14 (2001); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/12-30 (2001).
206 See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-4.1(d) (“Unless covered under some other 
provision of law providing greater punishment, a person who commits a felony at a time 
when the person knows the behavior is prohibited by a valid protective order . . . shall be 
guilty of a felony one class higher than the principal felony described in the charging 
document.”).
207
 Male domestic violence offenders who were involved in two or more domestic 
violence incidents with the same victim during the study period were more than eight times 
more likely than others to re-offend in the next eleven months.  Buzawa, E. & Hotaling G., 
An Examination of Assaults Within the Jurisdiction of Orange District Court:  Final 
Report, Washington, D.C., National Institute of Justice (June 2001); see also, Adele 
Harrell, Barbara Smith, Effects of Restraining Orders on Domestic Violence Victims, 239 in 
DO ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK?  (Buzawa & Buzawa eds. 1996) (study 
showing that history of past abuse was predictive of severity of future abuse).
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difficult to measure objectively.  They serve to empower a victim who may 
otherwise feel powerless, they help the state send a message that domestic 
violence is intolerable, and they provide a cheaper and alternative method of 
protection outside of criminal court.  Because of these unique benefits, 
orders of protection should be available to all domestic violence victims.
The next section provides a historical explanation for New York’s 
existing system in particular, and advocates its change.
V.  NEW YORK’S BIFURCATED SYSTEMS: A HISTORICAL EXPLANATION
A.  Introduction
New York’s system has become outdated, unresponsive, and 
inadequate to protect all domestic violence victims.  As discussed, New 
York’s family court and criminal court systems treat victims differently 
depending on whether they fall within the intersection between “family and 
household” member and “family offenses.”
Protection in the form of a civil order does not exist for victims who 
fall outside this intersection.  The heightened protection in the form of a 
“family offense” criminal order also does not exist for such victims.  Her 
only remedy is a standard criminal order of protection.  First, New York’s 
definition of “family or household” is problematic because it completely 
denies civil orders of protection to victims who do not satisfy it.  The 
definition includes only related persons, married or formerly married 
couples, and persons who share a child.208  This definition is too restrictive.  
It excludes a whole host of domestic violence victims including those who 
are or were living with their abuser, those who are or were in same-sex 
relationships with their abuser, and those who are or were dating their 
abuser.  It also excludes relationships that were once formed by marriage, 
but were terminated upon divorce or legal action such as former 
stepchildren or former foster children.209  Such victims can only rely on the 
criminal system for their protection.  But, the remedies and benefits there 
are not as extensive as those in civil court.  Also, because the same victim 
cannot satisfy the definition of “family or household member” for purposes 
of family court, she is also denied heightened protection in criminal court.  
Such victims cannot obtain “family offense” orders of protection; they are 
limited to standard criminal protection orders, which do not provide as 
much protection or as many benefits. 
208
 N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.11; N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 812 (McKinney 2003).
209 See, e.g., Orellana, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 993.  
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Second, New York’s definition of “family offense” is problematic 
because it is highly specific, and a large number of acts that can constitute 
domestic violence are excluded.  While some of the excluded crimes are 
less violent, most of the excluded crimes are much more violent.  For 
instance, all sex crimes are excluded from the list of “family offenses.”  As 
a result, even though she may be a member of the abuser’s “family or 
household,” a victim of rape will be denied entirely the supplemental 
protections that civil orders of protection provide.  Her sole protection is 
from criminal court.  Even there, however, the identical dilemma applies.  
Since rape is a crime that is not a “family offense,” the only protection to 
which she is entitled is a standard criminal order of protection.  
This “bifurcated” system exists as it does today because it is the 
remnants of an outdated one.  This system was created in the 1960s when 
“family offenses” were given exclusive jurisdiction in the Family Courts.  It 
was a time when domestic violence was thought to be “private,” and that 
family court could handle the problems of domestic violence within the 
private confines of the family.  The goal was to keep families together.  
However, the shift has now rightly focused on ending violence.  But 
currently, only a portion of victims is entitled to relief.  Since the focus is on 
ending domestic violence, New York should amend its laws to allow 
members of all intimate relationships, and all types of domestic violence 
crimes, the additional benefits civil orders of protection provide.  
B.  Building a Bifurcated System:  The exclusive jurisdiction provisions
Article Eight of the Family Court Act, which is entitled “Family 
Offense Proceedings” was created in 1962.210  As explained above, the 
legislature’s intent in doing this was to decriminalize domestic violence and 
to put its issues in a court that, it thought, was well-suited and uniquely 
qualified to solve what was at the time considered to be a private,211 family 
matter.212  Section 811 of article eight stated that the section’s purpose was 
210
 N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act. § 812 (McKinney 1975) (Repealed).
211
 Besharov, supra note 23 at 173.  
212
 The drafter’s report of original chapter 686, the Family Court Act, also expressed 
the legislature’s intent: 
Most family offense cases currently involve assault and disorderly 
conduct charges by wives against husbands. The wife's purpose in 
bringing the charge is rarely to secure a criminal conviction. Each case is 
somewhat different, but three patterns tend to emerge:
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help “preserve the family” and provide “practical help”:213
In the past, wives and other members of the family who suffered from 
disorderly conduct or assaults by other members of the family or 
Household were compelled to bring a ‘criminal charge’ to invoke the 
jurisdiction of a court.  Their purpose, with few exceptions, was not to 
secure a criminal conviction and punishment, but practical help.  
The purpose of this article is to create a civil proceeding for dealing with 
such instances of disorderly conduct and assaults. It authorizes the family 
court to enter orders of protection and support and contemplates 
conciliation procedures.  If the family court concludes that these 
processes are inappropriate in a particular case, it is authorized to transfer 
the proceeding to an appropriate criminal court.214
The original version of the statute gave exclusive jurisdiction to the 
family court “over any proceeding concerning acts which would constitute 
Some wives despair of salvaging their marriage. They seek to use the 
threat of criminal prosecution to compel the husband to leave home. 
Their main purpose is to secure protection, support, and custody of 
children--matters that are beyond the formal powers of criminal courts.
Others (normally married less than five years) treat the assault or 
disorderly conduct as a sign of trouble in their marriage. They turn to the 
court to obtain assistance in resolving the underlying difficulty. Hence, 
their main purpose is a form of conciliation. The criminal charge in these 
cases is thus essentially a means for invoking the court's jurisdiction, 
though it is said that the possibility of criminal prosecution deters 
husbands from continuing to beat their wives while the conciliation 
procedures are used.
In the third group are those who have been married for more than five 
years and who are prepared to settle for considerably less than an ideal 
existence. The husband works and supports the family. But, he drinks on 
weekends and beats or verbally abuses the wife. The wife's purpose here 
is to use the court proceeding to persuade her husband to stop beating her 
and, perhaps, to stop heavy drinking. Home Term in New York City, 
which has jurisdiction over such matters, uses Psychiatric and 
Alcoholism Clinics in an effort to help.
Without expecting miracles, the Committee believes that the civil 
proceeding provided in the new Family Court Act is better adapted for 
dealing with the underlying family difficulties than the penal method it 
would replace.
Report of Joint Legislative Committee on Court Reorganization, supra note 24.
213
 N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act. § 811 (McKinney 1981) (repealed)
214 Id.
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disorderly conduct or assault between spouses or between parent and child 
or between members of the same family or household.”215  Two years later, 
in 1964, in addition to disorderly conduct or assault, the legislature added 
harassment, menacing, reckless endangerment, and attempted assault to the 
crimes over which the family court had exclusive jurisdiction.216
In passing the Family Court Act, the legislature intended that these 
delineated acts would no longer be crimes if they were committed against a 
family or household member.  Instead, they were entitled “family offenses.”  
The criminal court could only hear “family offenses” if the family court 
transferred the case.217  This procedure was successful in decriminalizing 
family offenses.  The family court’s discretionary transfer power was used 
in only two percent of the 18,511 petitions that were filed in 1971-72, and 
the 17,277 petitions filed in 1972-73.218  It was this act that created the only 
avenue in the civil law (apart from divorce proceedings) where a victim of 
domestic violence could obtain a “family offense” civil order of protection.  
In the original version of the statute, “members of the same family 
or household,” was not defined.219  As a result, the courts were free to 
interpret the term, and often included non-married couples in the definition.  
The problem, of course, was that it was the abusers who advocated this 
more expansive definition of family or household to avoid the sanctions of 
criminal court.  
For instance, in People v. Dugar220, a man who had been living with 
a woman and her several children for four years argued that the criminal 
court did not have jurisdiction over his misdemeanor assault charge.  He 
argued that because he supported the woman and her children economically, 
and had eaten, slept, and generally subsided with them as a single domestic 
215
 N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 812 (McKinney 1962) (repealed).
216
 N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 812 (McKinney 1964)(repealed).
217
 Marjory Fields, Trial of Family Offenses:  A Practice Guide for Lawyers, 82 P.L.I. 
N.Y. 353, (2000).
218
 Annual Report of the Judicial Conference of the State of New York, 1972-73, p. 
350; Fields, supra, note 217 at 359.  See also, Wessel, Jurisdiction Over Family Offenses 
In New York:  A Reconsideration of the Provisions For Choice of Forum, 31 SYR. L. REV. 
601, 610 (1981).
219
 N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act. § 812 (McKinney 1975) (Repealed).
220
 235 N.Y.S.2d 152, 153 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1962).
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unit, they were of the same “household.”221  Because they were of the same 
household, he argued, jurisdiction vested exclusively in family court and 
could only be transferred to the criminal court from family court.222  The 
court agreed and dismissed the case.  In so holding, the court first admitted 
that “it would seem strange at first blush that a court whose purpose, in 
large part, is restoration and preservation of marriages, should concern itself 
with crimes between persons who are living in a meretricious 
relationship.”223 But, the court went on to observe the following: 
The legislature must be presumed to have been aware of a fact that is common 
knowledge to every law enforcement and social agency and to every court in this 
state, namely: there are countless households where man and woman reside with 
their offspring in a domestic relationship on a permanent basis without being 
legally married. Such households are responsible for many of the most difficult 
social problems concerning such agencies on a daily, routine basis. They present 
behaviour problems, support problems, mental and emotional problems. They 
concern the health, welfare and safety of children. They result in filiation 
proceedings, support proceedings and juvenile proceedings. In short, from a 
social point of view, this is a situation where the unique and flexible procedures 
and services available in the Family Court may possibly find a remedy.  In some 
instances it may even be possible to arrange a legitimate marriage or at least 
furnish adequate counseling and protection.224
It seems the court in Dugar was well-meaning by recognizing that, 
in reality, this collection of people operated like a marital family, and that 
family court was well-suited to its problems.  But, at the time, this was a 
double-edged sword.  Dugar was the first case to decide the issue of 
whether cohabitants were covered by the family court statute.  The court 
seemed willing to consider cohabitant relationships as functionally and 
actually the same as marital ones, and seemed comfortable with the de-
criminalization purposes of family court.  However, more and more abusers 
who were committing more violent acts against their cohabitants were 
asking the criminal court to dismiss their cases on jurisdictional grounds. 225
221 Id. at 154.
222 Id. at 154.
223 Id. at 153.
224 Id. at  653-54.  Of course, this type of reasoning did not take into account what 
would later become the ultimate goal of orders of protection:  to end the violence inflicted 
by one party against another.  
225 See, e.g, People v. Johnson, 265 N.Y.S.2d 260 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1965) (indictment of 
second degree assault transferred to family court where victim and defendant had held 
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Other courts rejected Dugar’s reasoning.  They discussed the Family 
Court Act’s interests in preserving the family unit, its public policy 
concerns of giving “practical help,” and the protection it would be 
providing to undeserving members of “immoral” unions.226  These courts 
largely disregarded the dual roles that family court was playing even then.  
While there were “conciliatory” procedures in place, one of the provisions 
of the Family Court Act was the civil order of protection provision.  One 
court recognized the importance of this provision, especially in non-marital 
abusive relationships:
[T]he Family court is authorized, among other things . . . to issue a 
temporary order of protection, which may . . . set forth reasonable 
conditions of behavior . . . .  Thus, the order of protection, as 
distinguished from a reconciliation, may require the respondent 
(defendant) to refrain from visiting the home or it may direct him to 
abstain from offensive conduct against any member of the household unit 
and may direct him to refrain from acts of commission or omission that 
may tend to make the home an improper place for a child.  That such an 
order may be even more necessary against one who is not a spouse, or a 
member of the family, but merely a member of the ‘household’ is too 
self-evident to require elucidation.227
Here, the court recognized the important role that civil orders of protection 
play in ending violence especially in cohabitation relationships.  From its 
statement that the need for protection in non-marital relationships is “too 
self-evident to require elucidation,” the court infers that members of non-
marital relationships are more willing to assault their partners.  While 
themselves out as husband and wife). 
226 See, e.g., People v. Ostrander, 295 N.Y.S. 2d 293 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. 1968).  There, the 
court refused to dismiss indictment for first degree assault where defendant, a woman who 
was married to someone else, stabbed her live-in boyfriend in the chest.  The court held 
that because the defendant committed the crime of adultery, to transfer the case to family 
court would be protecting an “immoral relationship” that was in violation of the Penal Law.  
Id. at 387.  In rejecting Dugar’s reasoning, the court explained that “if a literal 
interpretation of the word ‘household’ were adopted, . . . Article 8 if the Family Court Act 
would be available to homosexuals living together as husband and wife, and polygamists.”  
Id. at 297, ftnt. 1.  Also, in Best v. Macklin, 260 N.Y.S.2d 219 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1965) the 
family court refused jurisdiction and transferred the case to criminal court where the 
victim, together with her two children, lived with the assailant.  The court held that “it is 
the public policy of the State not to place children in a situation which would impair their 
morals.”  Id. at 221.
227 People v. James, 287 N.Y.S.2d 188 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968) (dismissing assault in the 
first degree and possession of dangerous weapons charges for transfer to the family court 
where victim and defendant lived together and held themselves out as husband and wife).
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difficult to gauge, some studies suggests this is, in fact, still the case.228
Ultimately, the question whether family court had jurisdiction over 
cohabitants was resolved by New York’s Court of Appeals in People v. 
Allen.229 There, the court held that only members of a solemnized marriage 
or a “recognized”230 common-law union were “family or household” 
members for purposes of civil protection order jurisdiction.  Specifically, 
the court held that the purposes contemplated by the Family Court Act, 
namely family cohesion, were inapplicable to non-marital relationships,231
and the state had no interest in maintaining such relationships.232
More interesting, even, than the specific grounds on which the court 
ruled were the specific cases that it refused to dismiss.  Like Dugar, the 
Allen court was dealing with several defendants who were attempting to 
have their criminal cases dismissed.  But, unlike Dugar, which dealt with a 
misdemeanor assault, the Allen court was careful to outline the facts of the 
higher-level offenses with which it was dealing.  All three defendants had 
already been convicted and sentenced to time for their felonies.  One was 
convicted of sodomy, while the other two were convicted of second degree 
assault and possession of dangerous weapons charges.  One of the 
defendants “broke into an apartment and stabbed his former girlfriend with 
an ice pick.”233  He had been sentenced to four years prison.  It is not a 
stretch to think that perhaps the court was also concerned that the 
defendants who were convicted and sentenced for these crimes would 
escape any criminal scrutiny.
Later courts also excluded other more violent crimes from the 
228 See, Klein and Orloff, supra note 15 at 837 citing studies suggesting that the 
amount of violence in non-marital relationships is at least equal to, or may surpass, the rate 
of violence between married couples.
229
 27 N.Y.2d 108, 113 (N.Y. 1970).
230
 The court specifically refused to “recognize” the relationship.  “Certainly, making 
available conciliation procedures, as contemplated by the Family Court Act, to such 
informal and illicit relationships as those before us, would clearly be contrary to public 
policy by conferring the privileges of Family Court services to a relationship which the 
Legislature has chosen not to recognize.”  Id. at 112-13.
231 Id. at 112.
232 Id.
233 Id.
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exclusive jurisdiction of the family court by limiting the list of “family 
offenses” through creative statutory interpretation.  In Whiting v. 
Shepard,234 a defendant who was accused of murdering his four-month-old 
daughter argued that his case should be transferred to the family court under 
the exclusive jurisdictional provisions.  The court denied the request 
holding that even though a basic element of the crimes of murder and 
manslaughter is assault did not bring those more violent offenses within the 
list of family offenses even though they may be committed by one family 
member against another.235  In so holding, the court heavily relied on the 
conciliatory intent of the statute and explained that because “the victims of 
the crimes of manslaughter and murder are obviously in no position to 
invoke the jurisdiction of the Family Court for practical help in the nature of 
protection or counciliation [sic] . . . .  the Legislature certainly did not 
intend that these crimes should come within the jurisdiction of the Family 
Court.”236  Instead, the court explained, “the Legislature has thus 
differentiated between serious and minor offenses on reasonable and logical 
grounds, and we can only conclude that the Family Court has no jurisdiction 
over offenses of manslaughter or murder since, by the very nature of these 
offenses, no future benefit or protection may be afforded to the victim.”237
However, the court used this reasoning to exclude additional serious 
crimes from family court’s jurisdiction even though the victim was left alive 
and could therefore arguably benefit from the “practical help” the family 
court could provide.  In People v. Bronson238 a husband threatened to kill 
his wife,239 stated he was going to kill her that night; he then attempted to 
run over her with his truck.  The grand jury indicted the defendant with 
attempted murder, and, during trial, the prosecutor asked for the lesser 
included offense of first degree assault.  The defendant was convicted of the 
assault charge.  The defendant sought the dismissal of the case on 
jurisdictional grounds.  In deciding the case, the court relied on Whiting to 
234
 312 N.Y.S.2d 412 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970).
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 Id.
238
 337 N.Y.S.2d 215 (1972).
239
 The court noted that the victim was the defendant’s “alleged” wife, but because of 
its holding refused to consider “the validity of the ceremonial marriage.”  Id. at 216.
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hold that like murder, even though assault was a basic element of attempted 
murder, it did not bring it within the list of family offenses “even though 
such offenses may be committed between spouses.”240  The court held that 
because the defendant was originally charged with attempted murder, the 
fact that the court later added first degree assault was inapposite.241
Nevertheless, the court ignored the policy grounds on which the Whiting
court based its decision, and instead stretched the interpretation of the 
statute to keep a more violent crime in criminal court.
The court similarly used a creative reading of the statute to keep 
jurisdiction over sex assaults even though they involved family or 
household members.  Again, it seemed concerned with keeping more 
violent crimes in criminal court.  In People ex rel. Doty v. Krueger,242 the 
defendant was indicted for first degree sodomy, and first degree sexual 
assault for engaging in forcible sexual contact with his nine-year old cousin.  
He argued that because he was related to his cousin, and because they lived 
in the same household, the exclusive family court jurisdiction provisions 
applied.  The court disagreed holding that the intent of the statute was to 
allow the family court to handle “domestic quarrels”243 and that the 
interpretation of “the serious and heinous acts and conduct implicit in the 
charges of sodomy and sexual abuse and contact with a nine-year old child 
as 'domestic quarrels' . . . . is repugnant and plainly untenable.244
But, the truth was that the legislature had not intended to limit the 
family court’s jurisdiction to less violent “domestic quarrels.”  As explained 
by the court in People v. Johnson, the court upon which Krueger relied, the 
legislature had considered and rejected language that would have given 
family court jurisdiction over only non-felonious assaults:
It is evident that careful thought was given by the Legislature to the 
question of the Family Court's jurisdiction over family assaults before the 
decision was made to include all such assaults and not simply those 
240 Id.
241
 In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on Matter of Whiting v. Shepard, 312 
N.Y.S.2d 412 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970).  There, the court held that because victims of murder 
and manslaughter could not invoke the “practical help” that the family court was intended 
to provide.
242
 295 N.Y.S.2d 581 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968).
243
 Id.
244
 Id.
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which were trivial.  Although the Judicial Conference had recommended, 
several years before the creation of the Family Court, that the proposed 
“Family Court should have jurisdiction over . . . Crimes and offenses, 
Except felonies, by or against children or between spouses”, neither the 
Judiciary Article of the Constitution nor the Family Court Act so limited 
the court's jurisdiction; the exclusionary words, “except felonies”, were 
significantly omitted.  And, as a matter of fact, the Judicial Conference 
unequivocally declared in 1963 that “The jurisdiction of the Family 
Court is not limited to any particular degree of assault.”245
However, the realities of a system’s failings that separated some 
“serious” from “non-serious” crimes became more apparent as time went 
on.  Despite the promises of the conciliatory procedures and the “practical 
help” that the Family Court Act was meant to give to domestic violence 
victims, the procedures put in place simply were not protecting women 
from further violence and even death.246  As reform efforts began to ascend 
in the late 1970s, a new consensus developed that the process of 
decriminalizing had gone too far.  The emphasis on family cohesion rather 
than ending violence against women all “had the net effect of giving abused 
spouses a practical license to continue assaults.”247
Change was slow and piecemeal, which has resulted in today’s 
system.  Responding to pressures from women’s groups and victim 
advocates, the legislature held hearings in 1977 to determine whether the 
exclusive jurisdictional system was serving the stated goal of family 
cohesion, or whether it was legitimizing domestic violence.248  That year in 
what ultimately proved an awkward change, the statute was amended to 
245
 282 N.Y.S.2d 481, 484-85 (N.Y. 1967).  In Johnson, a husband assaulted his wife 
with a knife and was indicted for second degree assault.  He sought to transfer the case to 
Family Court.  The Court ultimately agreed to do so and rejected the prosecutor’s argument 
that the Family Court Act was meant only to encompass non-felonious assaults based on 
legislative intent.
246
 Besharov, supra note 23 at 173, In Bruno v. Codd, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1977), the court denied summary judgment in favor of family court and allowed a tort 
claim to proceed against the family court, the police and probation officers where “Family 
Court petition clerks have, upon several occasions, denied petitioning wives timely access 
to the sitting Judge, and have abused their discretion in determining whether the wives' 
complaints are sufficient to warrant preparation of a petition.”
247 People v. Daniel T., 408 N.Y.S. 214, 215 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1978); Besharov, supra
note 23 at 174.
248 Id.
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allow concurrent jurisdiction in the family and criminal courts, but only 
until victims chose whether to file in criminal or family court.  Once they 
chose their forum, they could not file in the other.249  Also, still one of the 
stated purposes of the difference in treatment was that “an adjudication in 
family court is for the purpose of attempting to keep the family unit 
intact.”250
Also in 1977, the Family Court Act’s provisions relating to the 
definition of “family or household member,” also underwent change.  To 
legislate what the court in Allen had held, the legislature amended the 
statutory definition of “family and household member” to include only 
“persons legally married to one another” and “persons related by 
consanguinity or affinity.”251  However, women’s advocates complained 
that this definition was too narrow.252  The main complaints were that the
definition excluded formerly married spouses and informal or meretricious 
relationships, and even excluded such relationships that had produced 
children.253
To further facilitate the process of allowing victims to proceed in 
criminal court, the legislature passed a statute to deal with victims of 
“family offenses” in criminal court.  In 1977 it passed section 530.11254, 
entitled “Protection for victims of family offenses,” which incorporated the 
same definitions of “family or household member.”  It provided a system by 
which the criminal court could issue protection orders.  A corollary statute, 
entitled “protection of victims of crimes, other than family offenses” was 
passed in 1981.  It provided for the criminal court to issue less 
comprehensive “non family offense” criminal orders of protection to 
victims who were not crimes of the a delineated family offense, or who 
249
 The specific language of the statute read “a choice of forum by a complainant or 
petitioner bars any subsequent proceeding in an alternative court for the same offense.”  
N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act. § 812(b) (McKinney 1977) (repealed).  New York was the only state 
that required a victim to elect one jurisdiction at the exclusion of the other.  Other states 
allowed victims the option of civil, criminal, or both remedies.  Besharov, supra note 23 at 
181.
250
 N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act. § 812(d) (McKinney 1978) (repealed).
251
 N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act. § 812 (McKinney 1978) (repealed).
252 See Besharov, supra note 23 at 184-85.
253 Id.
254
 This was later renumbered to section 530.12 as it is today.
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were not a “family or household member” of the abuser.  These two 
different statutes to handle different varieties of crimes and victims are still 
in effect today.
In 1980, in response to the push to criminalize domestic violence, 
the legislature further amended the list of family offenses.  The list was 
amended to exclude assault in the first degree, which was assault using a 
deadly weapon.255  The legislature explained that it was amending the law 
to send a message that “serious” acts of violence in the home would not be 
tolerated:
This exclusion, like the present exclusion of attempted murder, is a public policy 
statement that serious acts of violence between family members will not be 
tolerated.  Violence in the home is as serious a breach of public order and safety 
as violence in the streets.  . . .  Strengthening of legal sanctions against violence 
in the home is a step toward stopping it in individual cases, and toward educating 
the public that violence in the homes is as much a criminal act as violence in a 
public place.256
This was the first public statement from the legislature since 1962 that 
domestic violence was intolerable.  Of course, this sent more than one 
message.  Aside from sending the message that “serious” acts of violence 
would not be tolerated in the home, it also said less “serious” acts would be.  
It also sent the message that the same acts committed against members of 
the same family or household were still not crimes, merely “family 
offenses.”  But, if the same act were committed against a non-family 
member, the abuser was chargeable in criminal court.
Also, in 1981, § 811 of the Family Court Act, which stated the Act’s 
intent about “practical help” and the importance of family cohesion was 
repealed.257  Presumably, this was meant to reflect a shift toward a focus on 
ending violence.  Section 812(d) was amended to state that family court 
proceedings were no longer to keep the “family unit intact,” but were to 
“stop the violence, end the family disruption, and obtain protection.”258  The 
legislature stated “that its first priority is protecting family members by 
ending the violence.  After that is accomplished, counseling and 
reconciliation can be undertaken in an atmosphere of security for all 
255
 Besharov, supra note 23 at 181.
256
 Governor’s Bill Memorandum, McKinney’s Session Laws of 1980, chaps. 530, 
531, 532, pp. 1877-78; Besharov, supra note 23 at 182.
257
 C. 416, L. 1980 McKinney’s Sessions Laws 1980, at A-329; Fields, supra note 217.
258
 N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act. §812(b) (McKinney 1981).
58 Judith A. Smith 15-Apr-04
members of the family.”259  But, the problem was still the jurisdictional 
provisions.  Once a victim chose family court, the criminal courts lost 
jurisdiction.260  The legislature was dealing with the tension between 
treating “serious” domestic violence like crime and “less serious crime” like 
a “family offense.”  
As a result, the legislature began adding and omitting more offenses to 
the list of family offenses.  It was careful to keep more violent crimes 
excluded.  The family offense provisions underwent several changes and 
other more specific crimes were added.  The legislature was careful to use 
the same language as the Penal Law so that the delineated offenses were 
tied to those definitions.  As of 1994, the statute listed the following crimes:  
disorderly conduct, harassment in the first and second degree, aggravated 
harassment in the second (but not the first) degree, menacing in the second 
and third degree (but not the first), assault in the second and third degree 
(but not the first), or attempted assault between spouses.
In 1994, the Family Court Act statute was amended once again with 
an attempt to swing the pendulum back toward the criminalization of 
domestic violence.  Under the amendment, the victim was still required to 
choose a forum, but the election did not become irrevocable until 72 hours 
after she filed a petition.261
In making this change, the legislature restated its commitment to 
ending violence, and minimized any focus on family cohesion.  Instead, the 
goal was to put an end to the violence.  In support of this position, the 
legislature cited the fact that domestic violence “is a crime which destroys 
the household as a place of safety, sanctuary, freedom and nurturing for all 
household members.”262  It also noted that domestic violence “results in 
tremendous costs to our social services, legal, medical and criminal justice 
systems, as they are all confronted with its tragic aftermath,” and that is “the 
single major cause of injury to women.  More women are hurt from being 
beaten than are injured in auto accidents, muggings and rapes combined.”263
Despite the evolution of the law in New York, the legislature explained, 
259
 Fields, supra note 217; Besharov, supra note 23 at 174.
260 See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
261
 N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 821(3)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1994)
262
 L. 1994, c. 222, §1.  
263
 L. 1994, c. 222, §1.  
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“death and serious physical injury by and between family members 
continues unabated.  The victims of family offenses must be entitled to the 
fullest protections of our civil and criminal laws.”  The intent was not to 
normalize domestic violence, but to condemn its more serious forms in 
public:264
Therefore, the legislature finds and determines that it is necessary to 
strengthen materially New York’s statutes by providing for immediate 
deterrent actions by law enforcement officials and members of the 
judiciary, by increasing penalties for acts of violence within the 
household, and by integrating the purposes of the family and criminal 
laws to assure clear and certain standards of protection for New York’s 
families consistent with the interests of fairness and substantial justice.265
Nevertheless, the exclusive jurisdictional provisions functionally remained 
in effect because the choice of forum was still irrevocable after 72 hours.  
As a result, some acts were crimes, while others were still mere “family 
offenses.”  
Also in 1994, the legislature amended the criminal contempt statutes 
in an attempt to strengthen the domestic violence statutes.  At that time, 
several of the criminal statutes used to deal with domestic violence were 
only punishable as misdemeanors, including violations of civil and criminal 
family offense orders of protection.  As a result, the legislature amended the 
crime of criminal contempt in the second degree, which was normally a 
class A misdemeanor, such that if a defendant violated a “family offense” 
order of protection issued either in family or criminal court and was 
convicted on criminal contempt in the second degree within the preceding 
five years, he was guilty of criminal contempt in the first degree, a class “E” 
felony.266
264
 Specifically, the legislature stated the following:
A great deal of progress has been achieved in the effort to heighten 
public awareness about domestic violence and to provide services for 
affective family members . . . These efforts have also played a key role in 
bringing this issue into the open . . . .  In recent years, for example, what 
was once largely considered a private matter has come to be more 
correctly regarded as criminal behavior.  
New York Family Protection and Domestic Violence Intervention Act, § 1 (1994).
265
 L. 1994, c. 222, §1 (emphasis added).
266
 N.Y. Penal Law § 215.51 (McKinney 1999).  The language of section 215.51 was 
amended in 2003, effective November 1, to incorporate previous convictions of first degree 
criminal contempt.  N.Y. Penal Law § 215.51 (McKinney 2003).  This provision does not 
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The choice of forum was not eliminated until 1996,267 and the 
criminal court was given concurrent jurisdiction over all “family offenses.”  
In 1999, the year the stalking offenses were created, the legislature added to 
the list of “family offenses” first, second, third and fourth degree 
stalking.268  Because there was no longer a danger that the criminal court 
would be divested of jurisdiction from crimes added to the list of family 
offenses, the legislature was free to add all four degrees of the new offense.  
This stands in stark contrast to the other offenses that are still omitted from 
the list of “family offenses,” such as first degree assault.  
As for the definition of “family or household” member, in response 
to part of the concerns of women’s groups about unmarried and formerly 
married people with children, the definition of “family or household” was 
expanded in 1984 to include formerly married persons, and persons who 
shared a common child.269  In 1987, New York’s legislature determined that 
there was a need to develop and fund programs to assist domestic violence 
victims.  As a result, it passed article 6-A of the New York State Social 
apply to a defendant who violates a non family offense criminal order of protection.  
However, there are provisions that enhance criminal contempt crimes upon violation of any 
order of protection regardless of whether the order is a “family offense” order of 
protection.  The crime of criminal contempt in the second degree can also constitute a class 
E felony if, in violation of any order of protection, a defendant intentionally places the 
victim in reasonable fear of injury by displaying a weapon, by engaging in a repeated 
course of conduct, by communicating with the victim, by coming in physical contact with 
the victim with intent to harass, annoy threaten or alarm, or by physical menace.  See also, 
Legislative Memorandum for Senate Bill 7930, “The remedy proposed [by this amendment] 
is simple and straightforward:  whenever defendants violate orders of protection by 
committing acts constituting independent crimes, such as menacing in the second degree, 
menacing in the third degree or aggravated harassment in the second degree, they can be 
prosecuted for committing the class E felony of criminal contempt in the second degree.  
Thus, a felony offense will be committed when a defendant violates an order of protection 
and in doing so brandishes a weapon at, threatens, stalks, menaces or harasses a person for 
whose protection the order was issued.”  Id.  Also, an abuser is guilty of first degree 
criminal contempt if in violation of any order he damages the victim’s property in an 
amount in excess of two hundred fifty dollars.  N.Y. Penal Law § 215.51 (McKinney 
2003).  Finally, an abuser may commit aggravated criminal contempt, a class D felony, if 
in violation of any order of protection, he intentionally or recklessly causes physical injury.  
N.Y. Penal Law § 215.52 (McKinney 2003).
267
 The ultimate election requirement’s elimination did not eliminate the district 
attorney’s discretion to decide not to pursue criminal charges against a defendant in 
criminal court. N.Y. Crim. P. L. 530.12(14) (McKinney 2003).
268
 N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act. § 812 (McKinney 1999 and Supp. 2003).
269 Id.
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Services Law, the Domestic Violence Prevention Act.270  It sets forth 
requirements and definitions for residential and non-residential services for 
domestic violence victims.  This Act also defines a victim of domestic 
violence as follows:
[A]ny person 16 years of age or older, any married person or parent 
accompanied by his or her minor child or children in situations in which 
such person or person's child is a victim of an act which would constitute a 
violation of the Penal Law, including, but not limited to acts constituting 
disorderly conduct, harassment, menacing, reckless endangerment, 
kidnapping, assault, attempted assault, or attempted murder” which result 
in injury or risk of harm . . . and such acts or acts are or alleged to have 
been committed by a “family or household member.”271
Not only does this definition include additional crimes such as 
kidnapping, attempted murder, and all forms of menacing and 
harassment,272 but its definition of family or household member is much 
more expansive.  It not only includes the same individuals as those under 
sections 812 of the Family Court Act, but it also includes “unrelated persons 
who are continually or at regular intervals living in the same household or 
who have in the past continually or at regular intervals lived in the same 
household273 or “any other category of individuals deemed to be a victim of 
domestic violence as defined by the department in regulation.”274  One of 
the department of social services regulations that governs residential 
domestic violence programs defines “family or household member” as 
including “unrelated persons who have had intimate or continuous social 
contact with one another and who have access to one another’s 
household.”275  Consequently, this definition both includes more crimes that 
render a domestic violence victim eligible for services, and includes 
virtually all forms of intimate relationships.276
270
 N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 459-a – 459-g (McKinney 2003)
271
 N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 459-a(1) (McKinney 2003)
272
 Notably, the statute excludes sex crimes and stalking crimes, but presumably the 
explicit statement that the list is non-exhaustive would seem to encompass all crimes of 
domestic violence.
273
 N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 459-a(1)(ii)(e) (McKinney 2003).
274
 N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 459-a(1)(ii)(f) (McKinney 2003).
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Nevertheless, the legislature has refused to adopt these same 
definitions for the purposes of civil and criminal domestic violence 
protection orders.  Currently, for purposes of the Family Court Act, and for 
“family offenses” in criminal court, “members of the same family or 
household means the following:  (a) persons related by consanguinity277 or 
affinity;278 (b) persons legally married to one another; (c) persons formerly 
married to one another; and (d) persons who have a child in common 
regardless whether such persons have lived together at any time.”279
Almost yearly, there have been unsuccessful attempts to extend the 
definition to at least include unmarried cohabitants.280  The courts continue 
to interpret the jurisdictional requirement strictly.281  The legacy of the 
exclusive jurisdiction provisions remains to the detriment of domestic 
violence victims.
New York’s legislature created the family court “family offense” 
civil protection order provisions to decriminalize domestic violence.  The 
aim was to provide “practical help” to families and to forward the goal of 
family cohesion.  Because of this historic context, and because of the 
change in social perceptions regarding domestic violence that took place 
over time, the legislature and the courts worked together to create a 
bifurcated system that pervaded in both the civil and criminal systems.  It 
treated victims differently depending on whether they were a member of the 
related by marriage if they did not share a household, or members of a dating relationship 
who do not have access to one another’s household.  
277
 “Consanguinity” is the “relationship by blood.”  Bryan A. Garner, A DICTIONARY 
OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 204 (2nd ed.)
278
 “A relation of affinity is based upon marriage and divorce destroys the foundation 
of that relation.”  Escalante, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 993 citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 59 (6th
ed. 1990).
279
 N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.11; N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 812(1)(a)-(d).
280 See, e.g., Assembly Bill A-7408, Senate Bill S-5883 (1981) (seeking to expand 
definition to include “persons who are residing together as though they were married to one 
another”); Assembly Bill A-988 (1997) seeking to expand definition to include “unrelated 
persons who are continually or at regular intervals living in the same household or who 
have in the past continually or at regular intervals lived in the same household.”); Senate 
Bill S-5438 (2003) (seeking to expand definition to “persons residing together continually 
or at regular intervals, currently or in the past.”); Besharov, supra note 23 at 186;,
281 See e.g., Gina C. v. Stephen F., 576 N.Y.S.2d 776, 777 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1991) 
(“These proceedings and the relief they provide are purely statutory and must be strictly 
construed by the Court.”).
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same “family or household” as their abusers and whether they were victims 
of specific “family offenses.” 
VI. A CALL FOR REFORM
Today, the focus of civil orders of protection in family court is not 
family cohesion or “practical help.”  Instead, the purpose of such orders in 
both family and criminal court is to stop the violence and to prevent 
violence from escalating.  Given that new focus and the social shift in the 
perceptions about domestic violence generally and civil orders of protection 
more particularly, the bifurcated system no longer works.  Not only are 
some victims of domestic violence completely unable to obtain civil orders 
of protection, others are only provided protection for less serious “family 
offenses.”  It is time for New York’s legislature to change its system to 
reflect this social shift and to provide equal protection to all victims of 
domestic violence.
New York’s differential treatment of family offenses from non 
family offenses creates two problems: not all victims of domestic violence 
are protected, and those who are, are not protected adequately.  Victims of 
abusers’ “families or households” are not adequately protected because of 
the legacy of the bifurcated system that has developed since the 1960s.  
Many crimes that should be included in the list of “family offenses” are 
omitted.  This means that even if victims are part of the abusers family or 
household, they cannot obtain a civil order of protection from an abuser, 
and must instead rely solely on the criminal system.  “Non family offense” 
criminal orders of protection, while providing some protection, are 
insufficient in relation to the additional benefits that civil orders provide.
Also, New York’s definition of “family or household member” in 
the family and criminal courts is too narrow.  It not only excludes members 
of dating relationships, but, unlike any other state in the country, it 
completely excludes members of cohabitation relationships.  Many of the 
concerns relating to married couples also relate to members of other 
intimate relationships.  Civil orders of protection, unlike criminal ones, are 
to prevent and deter future acts of violence.  There is little reason to deny 
them to all members of intimate relationships and to provide their benefits 
to these victims in addition to the remedies available in criminal court.  The 
law should be reformed to provide adequate protection to all victims. 
A.  Definition of “family offense”:  continuing problems
Assuming the family court has jurisdiction over the “family offense” 
proceeding, the complaints about the civil system are few.  It provides an 
extra remedy for the victim in addition to the options available to her in 
criminal court.  In family court, she can seek the specific types of relief, 
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including orders relating to children, that apply to her situation.  If an abuser 
violates the terms of the order, she has a multitude of options.  She can seek 
the help of police, she can request that criminal charges or criminal 
contempt charges be filed, she can initiate a new proceeding in family court, 
or, she has the further option of pursuing civil contempt proceedings.  Also, 
if the abuser violates the order, he is subject to additional criminal and civil 
penalties not only due to the violative act, but also due to the fact that he 
violated an existing order.  In this way, the victim is empowered to make 
her own decisions and to seek her own remedies, and the state’s interests in 
prevention of future risk of abuse and escalation of abuse are met.  
But, the primary problem with the Family Court Act here is that it 
does not provide protection to family victims unless the abuser commits a 
“family offense.”  The court is divested of jurisdiction over a huge number 
of crimes, both more violent and less so, that certainly could be 
characterized as crimes of domestic violence.282  The list of crimes that 
could include domestic violence, but that are currently excluded from the 
list of family offenses include the following: all sex crimes;283 first degree 
assault;284 first degree harassment; first degree menacing; aggravated 
harassment; reckless endangerment;285 kidnapping; coercion286; unlawful 
imprisonment; attempted murder; criminal mischief; arson; criminal 
trespass; burglary; robbery; eavesdropping;287 unlawful surveillance;288 and 
282
 Professor Merica has defined domestic violence as “a pattern of interaction that 
includes the use of physical violence, coercion, intimidation, isolation, and/or emotional, 
economic, or sexual abuse by one intimate partner to maintain power and control over the 
other intimate partner."  Jo Ann Merica, The Lawyer's Basic Guide to Domestic Violence, 
62 TEX. B.J. 915, 915 (1999).
283
 New York has at least twenty-five separate sex crimes, none of which are “family 
offenses.”  See N.Y. Penal Law Art. 130 (McKinney 2003).
284
 N.Y. Penal Law § 120.10 (McKinney 2003)
285
 N.Y. Penal Law § 120.20-.25 (McKinney 2003)
286 See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 135.65 (McKinney 2003) (A person commits coercion 
in the second degree when he compels or induces a person to engage in conduct which the 
latter has a right to abstain from, by means of instilling in the victim fear that that 
defendant will cause injury, damage to property, etc.).
287
 N.Y. Penal Law § 250.05 (McKinney 2003).
288
 N.Y. Penal Law §250.40-.50 (McKinney 2003).
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weapons crimes.289  Even if a victim is or was married to, is related to, or 
shares a child with the perpetrator, she cannot obtain any form of civil 
protection.  Instead, she must avail herself of the remedies available only in 
criminal court and hope that the prosecutor will proceed with her case and 
that it can be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  This may also serve to 
reward abusers who commit more serious crimes because they avoid the 
lesser burdens of proof and additional sanctions applicable in family court.  
The difference between family and non family offenses also presents 
special problems if the victim and the abuser share children.  Often victims 
of domestic violence are economically dependent on their abusers.  She 
may rely on him for medical expenses and child support.  In family court, 
the order of protection can include remedies relating to child support and 
visitation as well as medical expenses,290 but this is not true in criminal 
court.  The non family offense criminal orders do not specifically provide 
for orders relating to children, and the criminal court lacks jurisdiction over 
some provisions such as child custody and support.  While a victim may 
seek other remedies in family court, they will not usually specifically 
address future violent conduct, nor is the criminal system adequately 
equipped to address the violation of such orders.
Finally, if denied a remedy in civil court, the victim is denied all the 
benefits that civil orders of protection provide over, and in addition to, those 
available in criminal court.291  She may wish to avoid subjecting the abuser 
to criminal sanctions in criminal court because she needs his continued 
financial support, or she may fear increased retaliation if she pursues 
criminal charges.  She may wish to use the civil contempt proceedings 
available in civil court, which are not available in criminal court.  Or, she 
may simply want to be in control of the case rather than trusting her 
decisions to a prosecutor.
The legislature needs to revisit and reform its list of “family 
offenses.”  There is no reason to keep the “family offense” provisions 
limited to a specific list of crimes.  This is unduly restrictive; it undermines 
the seriousness of the acts that are included, and excludes entirely the acts 
that are not.  It also requires that the victim allege facts sufficient to satisfy 
the elements of each crime.  Instead, the statute should be amended to 
289 See N.Y. Penal Law Art. 265 (McKinney 2003).
290
 N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act. § 842 (McKinney 2003).
291
 See section III supra.
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include a more generic definition of acts of domestic violence.  For 
instance, the legislature may consider adopting a statute that provides for 
civil orders of protection “to prevent domestic violence.”  In turn, “domestic 
violence” could be defined as the following:
an act or pattern of acts that include acts or threatened acts of violence, or 
any act or pattern of acts constituting a crime in violation of chapter 40 of 
the consolidated laws of New York, or any municipal ordinance 
violation, when used as a method of coercion, control, punishment, 
intimidation, or revenge directed against a person with whom the actor is 
or has been in an intimate relationship.292
A statute such as this eliminates a victim’s need to establish that the abuser 
committed acts satisfying every element of a specific crime.  Instead, a
statute such as this incorporates all acts constituting domestic violence. 
In the 1960s, the focus was on familial cohesion.  That is no longer 
the case.  While legislature’s desire then may have been to deal with less 
serious forms of violence in family court, the focus there is now on ending 
violence, and preventing future violence from recurring or escalating.  
Criminal orders of protection alone are insufficient to serve this goal.  
Victims should be able to avail themselves of the additional protection 
provided in civil court.  The historical basis for this system is plain.  It was 
set up during a different time.  But, the evolution toward change has been 
needlessly slow.  Now, because the state is not divested of seeking criminal 
charges even if the offender is a member of the victim’s family or 
household, a victim should be allowed to seek every form of protection that 
she can regardless, and in some cases because of, the nature of the crime.  
B.  Definition of “family or household member”: continued rationales and 
problems 
Acts of domestic violence do not occur only between married and 
formerly married people and between parents of a common child.  Instead, 
domestic violence occurs in all forms of intimate relationships.  While New 
York need not necessarily amend its statute to redefine “family or 
household” to protect the members of these relationships in the same way, it 
should extend the same protection to all members of intimate relationships 
that are currently available to members of the same “family or household.”  
292
 This proposed statute is loosely based on Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-14-102 (2003).  
Colorado’s system allows “any municipal court of record . . . any county court, and any 
district court” to have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue a temporary or permanent 
civil restraining order against an adult or a juvenile who is ten years of age or older for the 
purposes of preventing assaults and threatened bodily harm, domestic abuse, emotional 
abuse of the elderly, and stalking.  The courts have 
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While in some circumstances the legislature may be able to provide rational 
reasons why it may not wish to redefine “family or household member” to 
include other types of relationships, it cannot provide rational reasons to 
deny protection to all victims of domestic violence in light of the stated 
governmental interests in providing civil orders of protection.293
As a result, the legislature should revisit the scheme that is currently 
in place and should redefine the types of relationships entitled to civil 
protection order coverage.  New York has two options.  First, it could 
amend the existing definition of “family or household” to include 
cohabitants and members of dating relationships.  Second, it could amend 
the statutory scheme to allow all victims of domestic violence to obtain 
orders of protection even if the remedy is not in family court, and create a 
new definition of “intimate relationship.”  Outside the context of provisions 
for children, there is little reason to keep civil orders of protection in family 
court.  Instead, the legislature could provide original, concurrent jurisdiction 
to any court of record as well as, or instead of, family court.  Then, the 
legislature could expand the types of relationships entitled to protection
without changing its definition of “family or household.”  For instance, in 
connection with the statute proposed above, it could adopt the following 
definition of “intimate relationship:”
A relationship between persons related either by blood, marriage, or 
former marriage, between past or present spouses, past or present 
cohabitants, persons who are the parents of the same child, or between 
two persons, including two persons not of the opposite sex, who have or 
had a social relationship of a romantic, but not necessarily sexual 
nature.294
293
 While this article briefly touches on the concepts of equal protection here, an in-
depth discussion of it is beyond its scope.  For a more in-depth discussion of the 
intersection of the Equal Protection Clause and civil orders of protection, particularly as it 
relates to same-sex relationships, see Nancy E. Murphy, Note, Queer Justice: Equal 
Protection for Victims of Same- Sex Domestic Violence, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 335 (1995); 
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A statute like this would serve several goals.  First, it would bring 
New York into compliance with the forty-nine other states that currently 
allow protection to cohabitants.  Second, it would bring New York into 
compliance with the majority of states that provide protection to members 
of dating relationships.295  Finally, it would simply provide protection 
where it is needed.
However, New York’s legislature has refused to pass statutes 
expanding the definition of “family or household” to include cohabitants 
and dating relationships, or to provide civil orders of protection to all 
victims of domestic violence in a forum outside family court.  The 
government may state several reasons; however, the reasons are neither 
rational nor related to the interests that the legislature has stated for 
providing civil orders of protection.  
One reason the legislature has failed to change the law may be that it 
believes domestic violence is not a problem outside the relationships 
currently covered.  Empirically, this is not the case.  A large amount of 
evidence suggests that domestic violence pervades not only into marital 
relationships, but other intimate relationships as well, such as cohabitation 
relationships, dating relationships, and same-sex relationships.  Few studies 
have focused specifically on unmarried cohabitants, but there is no 
indication that domestic violence does not occur at the same rates as in 
other types of intimate relationships.  One study in particular concluded that 
non-married men who live with their partners were more violent to their 
partners than their married counterparts.296  According to the New York 
State Division of Criminal Justice Services, in the year 2000 alone, there 
dating relationship.”  "’Dating relationship’ means a social relationship of a romantic or 
intimate nature.  
295
 While a discussion of such orders are outside the scope of this article, a statute such 
as this would give the legislature freer reign to provide civil protection orders to victims of 
crimes other than domestic violence.  For instance, to provide civil orders of protection to 
victims of sex crimes or stalking at the hands of a stranger, the legislature would currently 
be required to amend its definition of “family or household” to include rapists and stalkers.  
For obvious reasons this is more than untoward.  Instead, under a statutory scheme like the 
one proposed here, the legislature would only need to add a provision stating that in 
addition to preventing “domestic violence” civil orders of protection are necessary to 
prevent “stalking” or “sex assault or abuse.”  See, e.g. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-14-102(1) 
(2003).
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 Douglas A Brownridge, Shiva S Halli, Understanding Male Partner Violence 
Against Cohabiting and Married Women: An Empirical Investigation with a Synthesized 
Model, 17 J. FAM. VIOL. 341-361 (2002).
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were more than 23,000 cases of domestic violence among unmarried 
couples living together.297  Studies also suggest that women living with men 
at the time of the violent incident that lead to a protection order are 
significantly less likely to experience any type of abuse after an order is in 
place than women who do not live with their abusers.298
Members of dating relationships experience a startling amount of 
violence.  National surveys reveal that over thirty-five percent of both men 
and women inflict some form of physical aggression or sustained violence 
on their dating partners.299  Teens in dating relationships are also affected 
by intimate violence.  In terms of the actual number of teens affected, 
research indicates that approximately one out of ten high school students 
experiences physical violence in dating relationships.300  Other surveys of 
students in dating relationships show that an average of twenty-eight 
percent of the students experienced dating violence.301 Overall, studies 
indicate that anywhere from nine percent to thirty-nine percent of high 
school students experience dating violence at some point.302  A study of 
emergency room records found that 72 percent of the victims of domestic 
violence were not living with the abuser at the time they were assaulted.303
Partner abuse is also serious problem in gay and lesbian 
297
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298
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299
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70 Judith A. Smith 15-Apr-04
relationships.304  Same sex partner abuse is considered the third largest 
health problem facing gay men.305  Estimates set same-sex partner abuse as 
high as fifty percent,306 but the most conservative estimate is twenty 
percent.307  Regardless of the actual numbers of victims and incidents of 
abuse, it is plain that violence occurs in same-sex relationships, and the 
members of such relationships are also entitled to protection in New York 
State.308
A second possible government rationale for failing to amend the 
statute is its concern for opening the floodgates to a large amount of people 
thus overburdening the family courts.309  There are three responses to this.  
First, the legislature has the option of providing the same civil protection 
order remedies in a court other than family court.  Second, as of 2002, 
family offense petitions in family court only constituted about eight percent 
of its case load.310  While this number may go up somewhat if the 
relationship provisions are expanded, it should not create a large burden on 
304
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this court.  Second, an overburdening of family court is not an adequate 
rationale to deny some victims of the same type of harm the same 
protection.  As the legislature itself stated, domestic violence “is a crime 
which destroys the household as a place of safety, sanctuary, freedom and 
nurturing for all household members.”311 Acts of domestic violence in 
relationships other than marital ones create the identical problems, and the 
legislature has identical interests in ending the violence. 
Third, the government may reason that it is too expensive to provide 
victims of violence in other relationships with civil orders of protection. 
However, the costs of not providing civil orders of protection may, in fact, 
cause a greater cost burden.  As Professor Freedman has observed:
The hard work of sorting out how to respond in the domestic violence 
cases in the civil courts and particularly in family court can come to seem 
a low priority or even a poor investment of legal and decisional 
resources. Yet, unless the resources necessary to improve the fact-finding 
capacity of civil courts are provided, many domestic violence matters 
that could have been handled civilly will instead escalate and be shunted 
into the criminal courts, with greater costs to society and far less 
satisfactory results to the individuals and families (and especially the 
children) who are involved. Of course, many victims and their children 
will benefit significantly from having access to civil remedies, even if 
criminal remedies are later needed to address a continuation or escalation 
of abusive behavior.312
By failing to include more victims of domestic violence, the legislature is 
actually imposing more costs on society, both tangible and intangible.  As 
the legislature has stated, domestic violence “results in tremendous costs to 
our social services, legal, medical and criminal justice systems, as they are 
all confronted with its tragic aftermath,” and that is “the single major cause 
of injury to women.  More women are hurt from being beaten than are 
injured in auto accidents, muggings and rapes combined.” 313  Not only does 
this increase economic costs, it sends a message to the public at large that 
abuse in some relationships is more tolerable than in others.  Like criminal 
311
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312
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charges that send a social message that such conduct is intolerable, and that 
place domestic violence in a public forum, civil remedies provide these 
same social benefits, and can send the same public messages.
Fourth, there may be some concern that if the legislature expands 
the types of relationships entitled to protection, more frivolous claims for 
protection orders will result.  However, there are procedures and penalties 
in place for those who file false affidavits.  Second, there is no indication 
that people who file for civil orders of protection make false claims at a 
greater rate than people who file other types of civil claims.  For instance, 
other than personal jurisdiction venue and other similar provisions, there are 
not statutes limiting a person’s ability to file a civil claim for negligence, 
breach of contract, or other claims in civil court, yet the system relies on its 
own procedural safeguards to filter out claims without merit.  Similarly, the 
procedural safeguards in place in a proceeding for a civil order of protection 
should serve the same purposes, and are deserving of the same trust.  Also, 
the stakes involved in a civil order of protection remedy, namely one’s 
physical safety, are arguably stronger than those in other types of civil 
actions, namely money; therefore, the balance of risks versus benefits 
would seem to militate allowing more victims to seek civil orders of 
protection.
Finally, the government’s most likely argument is that it need not 
extend protection to relationships outside those already defined because the 
state has an interest in putting its scarce resources toward relationships it 
has an interest in promoting, legitimizing, and maintaining.314  In this way, 
the argument goes, the state serves its interests in promoting traditional 
families rather than non-traditional ones by limiting the remedy of civil 
orders of protection to “legitimate” families.  This argument comes to bear 
especially upon relationships between members of the same sex, especially 
in light of the recent debate regarding the legitimacy of gay marriages.315
314
 Ross Levi, legislative counsel for the Empire State Pride Agenda was quoted as 
saying that the legislature refused to expand the definition of “family and household” 
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But, the state already passed a law “legitimizing” and providing 
members of such relationships protection from domestic violence back in 
1987.  That was the year the legislature passed the Domestic Violence 
Prevention Act which defines “family or household member” as including 
“unrelated persons who are continually or at regular intervals living in the 
same household or who have in the past continually or at regular intervals 
lived in the same household316 or, “unrelated persons who have had intimate 
or continuous social contact with one another and who have access to one 
another’s household.”317  Consequently, the legislature has little basis on 
which to stake its claim that it cannot extend protection to such 
relationships.
Additionally, the rationales for “family offense” proceedings in 
family court have undergone a social shift.  Historically, those proceedings 
were to provide “practical help” and were meant to keep traditional 
families, even violent ones, together.  Also, they were meant to keep 
“domestic quarrels” out of the public eye.  But, over time, this focus 
changed to one on ending the violence.  In recognition of this social shift, 
the legislature acted to criminalize more acts of domestic violence, 
explaining that “violence in the home is as serious a breach of public order 
and safety as violence in the streets.  . . .  Strengthening of legal sanctions 
against violence in the home is a step toward stopping it in individual cases, 
and toward educating the public that violence in the homes is as much a 
criminal act as violence in a public place.”318
Also, as this social shift gained strength, it repealed the provisions 
regarding the importance of family cohesion and “practical help,” and 
amended the statutes to reflect the new social focus not on keeping the 
“family unit intact,” but to “stop the violence, end the family disruption, and 
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obtain protection.”319  Its new “first priority is protecting family members 
by ending the violence.  After that is accomplished, counseling and 
reconciliation can be undertaken in an atmosphere of security for all 
members of the family.”320  Consequently, by its own acts historically, the 
legislature cannot claim that the purposes of the family offense proceedings 
are to keep legitimate families together; their intent is to end violence.  The 
fact that the definition of family and household is so limited is more of a 
historical accident than evidence of intent to keep such families together.  
Also, practically speaking, to the extent it can be argued that civil protection 
orders constitute a “marital incentive,” the incentive is an absurd one.  
Essentially, by providing civil orders of protection only to those who are 
married or share children, the statute encourages a victim to marry or have 
children with the person who is abusing her so that she can then seek a civil 
order of protection that orders him to stay away.  The civil order of 
protection remedies actually encourage victims of violent relationships not 
only to seek help, but to exit the relationship.  The legislature can no longer 
rely on outdated, inapplicable rationales for a system that distributes 
protection based on the marital status, or parental status, of the victim.
CONCLUSION
New York has one of the most restrictive statutory structures in the 
nation for victims of domestic violence to obtain civil protection orders.  It 
finds the need for protection only where the definitions of “family offense” 
and “family or household member” intersect.  There is a historical 
explanation for this odd state of the law.  Beginning in the 1960s, the 
legislature attempted to deal with domestic violence in a more private 
forum.  It sought to defuse violence in families and was attempting, above 
all, to keep these families together.  Over time, though, the legislature 
responded to a change in the social view of domestic violence.  The focus 
began to shift from keeping families together, to criminalizing acts of 
domestic violence and bringing it to public attention.321   As a result, in an 
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A great deal of progress has been achieved in the effort to heighten 
public awareness about domestic violence and to provide services for 
affective family members . . . These efforts have also played a key role in 
bringing this issue into the open . . . .  In recent years, for example, what 
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attempt to deal with the tension between the two interests, the legislature 
created, in what can fairly be characterized as a historical accident, the 
bifurcated system that exists today.
But, the shift in the role that civil orders of protection played from 
keeping families together to deterring and deescalating future violence 
renders the historical rationales meaningless as applied to their more 
contemporary goals.  New York can provide few reasons for maintaining its 
current system, and must reform its civil protection order statutes to capture 
all victims of domestic violence, and to include all crimes as bases for 
protection.  To the extent the legislature can provide current rationales to 
maintain its differential treatment of domestic violence victims, it must at 
least provide rational reasons that bear some relation to the goals the civil 
order of protection statutes serve.  It is not at all clear that the legislature can 
satisfy that burden here.
The need for reform is plain.  Domestic violence does not exist only 
between the members of relationships that the legislature has sanctioned for 
protection.  Instead, violence cuts across all forms of romantic relationships 
and the victims of violence in those relationships deserve the same 
protection.  This is true not only for New York, but for every state.  Each 
state should expand its civil protection order coverage to include all victims, 
and all types of domestic violence.
was once largely considered a private matter has come to be more 
correctly regarded as criminal behavior.  
New York Family Protection and Domestic Violence Intervention Act, § 1 (1994).
APPENDIX A
State Related Married Share child Cohabitation (past 
or present)
Dating Other Excludes 
Same Sex?
Alabama • • • • as interpreted by 
case law, . 
Haraway v. 
Phillips, 2002 WL 
1728619 
(Ala.Civ.App.200
2).
Alaska • • • • •
Arizona • • • • Pregnant
Arkansas • • • •
California • • • • •
Colorado • • • • •
Connecticut • • • • •
D.C. • • • • •
Delaware • • • only 
persons of 
opposite 
sex
• only present 
cohabitants of 
opposite sex
•  cohabitants 
and persons 
sharing child 
Florida • • • •
Georgia • • • •
Hawaii • • • • •
Idaho • • • • •
Illinois • • • • •
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Indiana • • • •
Iowa • • • • within the past 
year
•
Kansas • • •
Kentucky • • • •
Louisiana • • • opposite sex only • cohabitants 
Maine • • • • •
Maryland • • • •  current only 
Massachusetts • • • • •
Michigan • • • • •
Minnesota • • • • • Pregnant
Mississippi • • Not by 
statute 
Protected by 
AG opinion 
Op.Atty.Gen. 
No. 2000-
0588, 
Carrubba, 
October 6, 
2000
• • current 
dating 
relations
hip
Missouri • • •
Montana • • • • opposite 
sex only
• dating 
relationships
Nebraska • • • •
Nevada • • • • •
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New Hampshire • • • • •
New Jersey • • • • • Pregnant
New Mexico • • • •
New York • • •
North Carolina • • • • opposite sex only • opposite 
sex only
• cohabitation 
and dating 
relationships
North Dakota • • • • • current 
only
Any other 
person with a 
sufficient 
relationship 
to the 
abusing 
person as 
determined 
by the court
Ohio • • • • Neutral, but 
case law has 
interpreted as 
being opposite 
sex only.
Oklahoma • • • • • Present 
spouses of 
ex-spouses
Oregon • • • • • within 
past 2 
years
Pennsylvania • • • • •
Rhode Island • • • •
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South Carolina • • • • opposite sex only • cohabitants
South Dakota • • • •
Tennessee • • • • •
Texas • • • • •
Utah • • • •  living as a 
spouse
Pregnant
Vermont • • • •
Virginia • • • • within 1 year 
Washington • • • • •
West Virginia • • • •
Wisconsin • • • • •
Wyoming • • • • •
